نظرية مدمجة

النظرية المدمجة (بالإنجليزية: compact theory)‏، تشير إلى نظريتين تتعلقان بتطوير دساتير فدرالية.في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، يختلف عن نظرية العقد في أنه يفضل حقوق الولايات على حقوق الحكومة الفيدرالية.

نظرية الاتفاق في الولايات المتحدة

فيما يتعلق ب دستور الولايات المتحدة، ترى النظرية المدمجة أن الدولة تشكلت من خلال ميثاق اتفقت عليه جميع الولايات، وبالتالي فإن الحكومة الفيدرالية هي من صنع الولايات.^[1] ونتيجة لذلك، ينبغي أن تكون الولايات هي المحكم النهائي بشأن ما إذا كانت الحكومة الفيدرالية قد تجاوزت حدود سلطتها على النحو المنصوص عليه في الميثاق.

الحجج المؤيدة للنظرية

المؤيدون الرئيسيون لهذه النظرة إلى دستور الولايات المتحدة نشأوا في المقام الأول من فرجينيا والولايات الجنوبية الأخرى.^{citation needed} من بين المؤيدين للنظرية توماس جفرسون،^[2] في ظل هذه النظرية وكرد فعل على قوانين الغريبة والفتنة لعام 1798, زعم جيفرسون أن الحكومة الفيدرالية تجاوزت سلطتها، ودعت إلى إلغاء القوانين من قبل الولايات. القرار الأول ل Kentucky Resolutions بدأ بالقول:

تقرر، أن عدة دول تتألف من الولايات المتحدم الامريكية، ليست موحدة على مبادئ التقديم غير المحدود لحكومتها العامة؛ ولكن عن طريق التعاقد بموجب أسلوب ولقب دستور للولايات المتحدة و تعديلاته، شكلوا حكومة عامة لأغراض خاصة، مفوضة لتلك الحكومة بعض السلطات المحددة، مع الاحتفاظ بكل دولة لنفسها، الكتلة المتبقية من الحق في الحكم الذاتي الخاص بها؛ وأنه عندما تتولى الحكومة العامة سلطات غير مفوضة، فإن أفعالها غير قانونية وباطلة ولا قوة لها؛ أنه في هذا الاتفاق، انضمت كل ولاية كدولة، وهي طرف متكامل؛ أن الحكومة التي تم إنشاؤها بموجب هذا الميثاق لم يتم تعيينها كقاض حصري أو نهائي لمدى السلطات المخولة لها؛ لأن ذلك كان سيجعل سلطتها التقديرية، وليس الدستور، قياس سلطاتها؛ ولكن ذلك، كما هو الحال في جميع حالات التعاقد الأخرى بين السلطات التي لا يوجد فيها قاضي مشترك، لكل طرف الحق المتساوي في أن يحكم بنفسه، وكذلك المخالفات كما في طريقة وتدبير الإنصاف.^[3]

في هذه الأثناء، أكد جيمس ماديسون في الفيدرالي رقم 39، أن "الشعب" لم يكن كأفراد يؤلفون أمة واحدة كاملة، ولكنهم يؤلفون الدول المستقلة والمستقلة التي ينتمون إليها على التوالي؛ "وأن الدستور" يجب أن يكون الموافقة والتصديق على العديد من الدول، المستمدة من السلطة العليا في كل دولة، وسلطة الشعب نفسه "؛ وأن" فعل الشعب، بصفته تشكيل العديد من الدول المستقلة، وليس تشكيل دولة واحدة، واضح من هذا الاعتبار الفردي ".وبالمثل، كما لوحظ في المادة السابعة من الدستور، لم يتم التصديق من خلال اتفاقية شعبية واحدة، ولكن اتفاقيات الدول المصدقة فقط، وسيدخل الدستور حيز التنفيذ بين تلك الدول المصدقة فقط.

الحجج ضد النظرية

اتخذ آخرون موقفًا مفاده أن الحكومة الفيدرالية ليست ميثاقًا بين الولايات، ولكن بدلاً من ذلك تم تشكيلها مباشرة من قبل الشعب، في ممارسة سلطتهم السيادية. قرر الشعب أن الحكومة الفيدرالية يجب أن تكون أعلى من الولايات. بموجب هذا الرأي، لا يحق للولايات، التي ليست أطرافاً في الدستور، أن تحدد لنفسها النطاق المناسب للسلطة الفدرالية، ولكنها بدلاً من ذلك ملزمة بقرارات الحكومة الفيدرالية. اتخذت ولاية فيرمونت هذا الموقف ردا على قرارات كنتاكي.^[4] Daniel Webster دعا هذا الرأي في كتابه مناقشة مع روبرت هاين في مجلس الشيوخ عام 1830:

لا يمكنني أن أري أن الدستور ميثاق بين حكومات الولايات. الدستور نفسه، في مقدمته، يدحض هذه الفكرة؛ ويعلن أنه تم ترسيخها وإنشاءها من قبل شعب الولايات المتحدة. حتى الآن من القول أنه تم إنشاؤه من قبل حكومات دول عديدة، حتى أنه لا يقول أنه تم إنشاؤه من قبل شعوب العديد من الدول؛ لكنه يعلن أنه تم تأسيسه من قبل شعب الولايات المتحدة، في المجموع. ... عندما يقول السيد أن الدستور هو ميثاق بين الولايات، فإنه يستخدم لغة تنطبق بالضبط على الاتحاد القديم. يتحدث كما لو كان في الكونجرس قبل عام 1789. يصف بشكل كامل تلك الحالة القديمة من الأشياء الموجودة آنذاك. كان الاتحاد بصرامة ميثاقًا؛ والدول، كدول، أطراف فيها. لم يكن لدينا حكومة عامة أخرى. ولكن تم العثور على هذا غير كاف، وغير كافية للضرورات العامة. لم يكن الناس راضين عنها، وتعهدوا بإقامة أفضل. وتعهدوا بتشكيل حكومة عامة، يجب أن تقف على أساس جديد؛ لا كونفدرالية، لا عصبة، لا ميثاق بين الولايات، بل دستور؛ حكومة شعبية، تأسست في انتخابات شعبية، مسؤولة مباشرة أمام الناس أنفسهم، ومقسمة إلى فروع مع حدود السلطة المقررة، والواجبات المحددة. لقد رسموا مثل هذه الحكومة، وأعطوها اسم الدستور، حيث أنشأوا توزيع السلطات بين هذا، وحكومتهم العامة، والعديد من حكومات الولايات.^[5]

التعليق الرائد في القرن التاسع عشر على الدستور، وبالمثل، رفضت تعليقات القاضي قصة جوزيف على دستور الولايات المتحدة (1833) النظرية المدمجة، وخلصت إلى أن الدستور وضع مباشرة من قبل الشعب، وليس من قبل الولايات، وأنه يشكل القانون الأعلى، وليس مجرد ميثاق.^[6]

في السنوات التي سبقت الحرب الأهلية، تم استخدام النظرية المدمجة من قبل الولايات الجنوبية للدفاع عن حقها في إلغاء القانون الفيدرالي والانفصال عن الاتحاد. على سبيل المثال، خلال ازمة ابطال 1828-1832،جون كالهون جادل في معرض جنوب ولاية كارولينا واحتجاجه على أن الولايات، بصفتها طرفا في ميثاق، كان من حقهما الحكم على أنفسهما فيما إذا كانت شروط الاتفاق قد تم الوفاء بها. ووصف كالهون هذا «الحق في الحكم» بأنه «صفة أساسية للسيادة»، والتي احتفظت بها الولايات عند صياغة الدستور. وقال كالهون إن الولايات لها الحق في إبطال أو الاعتراض على أي قوانين لا تتفق مع الميثاق.^[7]

عندما انفصلت الولايات الجنوبية في 1860-1861، اعتمدوا على النظرية المدمجة لتبرير الانفصال. جادلت الولايات الجنوبية بأن الولايات الشمالية انتهكت الميثاق من خلال تقويض ومهاجمة مؤسسة العبودية وحقوق ملكية العبيد في عبيدهم. ذكرت الولايات الجنوبية أنها بالتالي مبررة للانسحاب من الميثاق بين الولايات.^[8]

رفضت المحكمة العليا للولايات المتحدة فكرة أن الدستور ميثاق بين الولايات. وبدلاً من ذلك، ذكرت المحكمة أن الدستور وضع مباشرة من قبل شعب الولايات المتحدة، وليس من قبل الولايات.

في أحد القرارات الهامة الأولى للمحكمة العليا، Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)، صرح رئيس القضاة جون جاي أن الدستور وضع مباشرة من قبل الشعب. أشار جاي إلى لغة ديباجة الدستور، التي تنص على أن الدستور قد تم وضعه ووضعه من قبل "نحن الشعب"، وذكر: "هنا نرى الأشخاص الذين يتصرفون كسلطات للبلاد بأكملها، وفي لغة السيادة، ووضع الدستور الذي من خلال إرادتهم أن حكومات الولايات يجب أن تكون ملزمة.^[9]

في قضية Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816)، رفضت المحكمة العليا صراحة فكرة أن الدستور ميثاق بين الولايات، قائلة: "دستور الولايات المتحدة لم يتم تأسيسه وتأسيسه من قبل الولايات بصفتها السيادية، ولكن بشكل قاطع، كما تعلن ديباجة الدستور، من قبل "شعب الولايات المتحدة". قارنت المحكمة بين مواد الاتحاد السابقة والدستور، واصفة مواد الاتحاد بأنها ميثاق بين الولايات، في حين ذكرت أن الدستور كان ليس بواسطة الدول بل من قبل الشعب.^[10]

وبالمثل، في قضية McCulloch v. Maryland (1819(، ذكرت المحكمة العليا أن الدستور الاتحادي ينطلق مباشرة من الشعب، ولم تقم الولايات بإنشائه. وذكرت المحكمة أن الدستور ملزم للولايات ولا يمكن أن تلغيه. وقارنت المحكمة مرة أخرى مواد الاتحاد، التي وضعتها الولايات، مع الدستور الذي وضعه الشعب.^[11]

بعد الحرب الأهلية، في قضية Texas v. White (1869)، وهي قضية تناقش الوضع القانوني للولايات الجنوبية التي حاولت الانفصال، ذكرت المحكمة العليا أن الاتحاد لم يكن مجرد ميثاق بين الولايات؛ بدلاً من ذلك، كان الاتحاد «أكثر من مجرد ميثاق.»^[12]

النظرية المدمجة في كندا

في السياق الكندي، تفترض النظرية المدمجة أن الكونفدرالية كانت اتفاقية بين الشعبين المؤسسين، الفرنسسيين والإنجليز، وبالتالي يجب أن تتمتع كيبيك بسلطات فيتو خاصة تتعلق بموقعها في الهيكل الفيدرالي.^[13] ومع ذلك، تم رفض النظرية المدمجة من قبل المحكمة العليا لكندا ^{[الإنجليزية]} في غام 1981 مرجع Patriation .^[14]غالبًا ما يتم تطوير النظرية المدمجة من قبل القوميين في كيبيك.

انظر أيضا

•الجمهورية الكلاسيكية
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المراجع

^ Benner، David (2015). Compact of the Republic: The League of States and the Constitution. Minneapolis, MN: Life & Liberty Publishing Group.
^ Jefferson to William B. Giles in letter dated 12/26/1825. نسخة محفوظة 13 سبتمبر 2019 على موقع واي باك مشين.
^ Kentucky Resolutions of 1798; see also "Reclaiming the American Revolution," Wm. J. Watkins, Jr.,Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p.165.
^ In response to the Kentucky Resolutions' assertion that the states formed the federal government by compact and retained the right to judge the federal government's laws, Vermont said: "This cannot be true. The old confederation, it is true, was formed by the state Legislatures, but the present Constitution of the United States was derived from an higher authority. The people of the United States formed the federal constitution, and not the states, or their Legislatures. And although each state is authorized to propose amendments, yet there is a wide difference between proposing amendments to the constitution, and assuming, or inviting, a power to dictate and control the General Government." {{استشهاد بكتاب| الأخير = Anderson | الأول = Frank Maloy | الفصل = [[s:Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions/II|Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions | ناشر = American Historical Review | سنة = 1899 | مكان = | صفحات = 233}}
^ Webster's Second Reply to Hayne, January 26, 1830
^ Story wrote: "In what light, then, is the constitution of the United States to be regarded? Is it a mere compact, treaty, or confederation of the states composing the Union, or of the people thereof, whereby each of the several states, and the people thereof, have respectively bound themselves to each other? Or is it a form of government, which, having been ratified by a majority of the people in all the states, is obligatory upon them, as the prescribed rule of conduct of the sovereign power, to the extent of its provisions? ... There is nowhere found upon the face of the constitution any clause, intimating it to be a compact, or in anywise providing for its interpretation, as such. On the contrary, the preamble emphatically speaks of it, as a solemn ordinance and establishment of government. The language is, 'We, the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.' The people do ordain and establish, not contract and stipulate with each other. The people of the United States, not the distinct people of a particular state with the people of the other states. The people ordain and establish a 'constitution,' not a 'confederation.' ... Nor should it be omitted, that in the most elaborate expositions of the constitution by its friends, its character, as a permanent form of government, as a fundamental law, as a supreme rule, which no state was at liberty to disregard, suspend, or annul, was constantly admitted, and insisted on, as one of the strongest reasons, why it should be adopted in lieu of the confederation." Story، Joseph (1833). Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Boston: Hilliard Gray & Co. ج. 1. ص. 318–319, 326.
^ "[T]he sovereign powers delegated are divided between the General and State Governments, and that the latter bold their portion by the same tenure as the former, it would seem impossible to deny to the States the right of deciding on the infractions of their powers, and the proper remedy to be applied for their correction. The right of judging, in such cases, is an essential attribute of sovereignty, of which the States cannot be divested without losing their sovereignty itself, and being reduced to a subordinate corporate condition. In fact, to divide power, and to give to one of the parties the exclusive right of judging of the portion allotted to each, is, in reality, not to divide it at all; and to reserve such exclusive right to the General Government (it matters not by what department to be exercised), is to convert it, in fact, into a great consolidated government, with unlimited powers, and to divest the States, in reality, of all their rights. ... But the existence of the right of judging of their powers, so clearly established from the sovereignty of States, as clearly implies a veto or control, within its limits, on the action of the General Government, on contested points of authority. ... May the General Government ... encroach on the rights reserved to the States respectively? To the States respectively each in its sovereign capacity is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of interposition, to arrest the encroachment." South Carolina Exposition and Protest, 1828
^ For example, South Carolina's statement of secession said: "Thus was established, by compact between the States, a Government with definite objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. ... [T]he constituted compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation. ... Those States have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection." Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, 1860
^ "[The people] made a Confederation of the States the basis of a general government [i.e. the Articles of Confederation]. Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it, and then the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution. It is remarkable that, in establishing it, the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and, conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, 'We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country, and, in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will that the State governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform. Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Jay went on to say that the people had delegated to the federal judiciary the task of interpreting the meaning, construction, and operation of the Constitution.
^ "The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by 'the people of the United States.' ... The Constitution was for a new Government, organized with new substantive powers, and not a mere supplementary charter to a Government already existing. The Confederation was a compact between States, and its structure and powers were wholly unlike those of the National Government. The Constitution was an act of the people of the United States to supersede the Confederation, and not to be ingrafted on it, as a stock through which it was to receive life and nourishment." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
^ "The government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people, and is declared to be ordained, 'in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.' ... It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State Governments. The Constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties. ... To the formation of a league such as was the Confederation, the State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, 'in order to form a more perfect union,' it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective Government, possessing great and sovereign powers and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The Government of the Union then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case) is, emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
^ "When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
^ Stephen Brooks, Canadian Democracy: An Introduction, 5th ed. (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201.
^ Brooks, 201.

[1] Benner، David (2015). Compact of the Republic: The League of States and the Constitution. Minneapolis, MN: Life & Liberty Publishing Group.

[2] Jefferson to William B. Giles in letter dated 12/26/1825. نسخة محفوظة 13 سبتمبر 2019 على موقع واي باك مشين.

[3] Kentucky Resolutions of 1798; see also "Reclaiming the American Revolution," Wm. J. Watkins, Jr.,Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p.165.

[4] In response to the Kentucky Resolutions' assertion that the states formed the federal government by compact and retained the right to judge the federal government's laws, Vermont said: "This cannot be true. The old confederation, it is true, was formed by the state Legislatures, but the present Constitution of the United States was derived from an higher authority. The people of the United States formed the federal constitution, and not the states, or their Legislatures. And although each state is authorized to propose amendments, yet there is a wide difference between proposing amendments to the constitution, and assuming, or inviting, a power to dictate and control the General Government." {{استشهاد بكتاب| الأخير = Anderson | الأول = Frank Maloy | الفصل = [[s:Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions/II|Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions | ناشر = American Historical Review | سنة = 1899 | مكان = | صفحات = 233}}

[5] Webster's Second Reply to Hayne, January 26, 1830

[6] Story wrote: "In what light, then, is the constitution of the United States to be regarded? Is it a mere compact, treaty, or confederation of the states composing the Union, or of the people thereof, whereby each of the several states, and the people thereof, have respectively bound themselves to each other? Or is it a form of government, which, having been ratified by a majority of the people in all the states, is obligatory upon them, as the prescribed rule of conduct of the sovereign power, to the extent of its provisions? ... There is nowhere found upon the face of the constitution any clause, intimating it to be a compact, or in anywise providing for its interpretation, as such. On the contrary, the preamble emphatically speaks of it, as a solemn ordinance and establishment of government. The language is, 'We, the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.' The people do ordain and establish, not contract and stipulate with each other. The people of the United States, not the distinct people of a particular state with the people of the other states. The people ordain and establish a 'constitution,' not a 'confederation.' ... Nor should it be omitted, that in the most elaborate expositions of the constitution by its friends, its character, as a permanent form of government, as a fundamental law, as a supreme rule, which no state was at liberty to disregard, suspend, or annul, was constantly admitted, and insisted on, as one of the strongest reasons, why it should be adopted in lieu of the confederation." Story، Joseph (1833). Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Boston: Hilliard Gray & Co. ج. 1. ص. 318–319, 326.

[7] "[T]he sovereign powers delegated are divided between the General and State Governments, and that the latter bold their portion by the same tenure as the former, it would seem impossible to deny to the States the right of deciding on the infractions of their powers, and the proper remedy to be applied for their correction. The right of judging, in such cases, is an essential attribute of sovereignty, of which the States cannot be divested without losing their sovereignty itself, and being reduced to a subordinate corporate condition. In fact, to divide power, and to give to one of the parties the exclusive right of judging of the portion allotted to each, is, in reality, not to divide it at all; and to reserve such exclusive right to the General Government (it matters not by what department to be exercised), is to convert it, in fact, into a great consolidated government, with unlimited powers, and to divest the States, in reality, of all their rights. ... But the existence of the right of judging of their powers, so clearly established from the sovereignty of States, as clearly implies a veto or control, within its limits, on the action of the General Government, on contested points of authority. ... May the General Government ... encroach on the rights reserved to the States respectively? To the States respectively each in its sovereign capacity is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of interposition, to arrest the encroachment." South Carolina Exposition and Protest, 1828

[8] For example, South Carolina's statement of secession said: "Thus was established, by compact between the States, a Government with definite objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. ... [T]he constituted compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation. ... Those States have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection." Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, 1860

[9] "[The people] made a Confederation of the States the basis of a general government [i.e. the Articles of Confederation]. Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it, and then the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution. It is remarkable that, in establishing it, the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and, conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, 'We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country, and, in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will that the State governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform. Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Jay went on to say that the people had delegated to the federal judiciary the task of interpreting the meaning, construction, and operation of the Constitution.

[10] "The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by 'the people of the United States.' ... The Constitution was for a new Government, organized with new substantive powers, and not a mere supplementary charter to a Government already existing. The Confederation was a compact between States, and its structure and powers were wholly unlike those of the National Government. The Constitution was an act of the people of the United States to supersede the Confederation, and not to be ingrafted on it, as a stock through which it was to receive life and nourishment." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

[11] "The government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people, and is declared to be ordained, 'in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.' ... It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State Governments. The Constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties. ... To the formation of a league such as was the Confederation, the State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, 'in order to form a more perfect union,' it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective Government, possessing great and sovereign powers and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The Government of the Union then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case) is, emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

[12] "When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).

[13] Stephen Brooks, Canadian Democracy: An Introduction, 5th ed. (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201.

[14] Brooks, 201.

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