افتح القائمة الرئيسية

إحداثيات: 34°23′41″N 132°27′17″E / 34.39468°N 132.45462°E / 34.39468; 132.45462

الهجوم النووي على هيروشيما وناجازاكي
جزء من حرب المحيط الهادي، الحرب العالمية الثانية
Atomic bombing of Japan.jpg
سحابة عيش الغراب، فوق المدينتين اليابانيتين عام 1945، هيروشيما (يسار) وناجازاكي (يمين)
معلومات عامة
التاريخ 6 و9 أغسطس، 1945
الموقع هيروشيما وناغاساكي، اليابان
النتيجة استسلام اليابان
المتحاربون
 الولايات المتحدة  اليابان
الخسائر
لا شيء 90,000-166,000 قتيل في هيروشيما [1]،60,000-80,000 قتيل في نجازاكي[1]

الهجوم النووي على هيروشيما وناجازاكي هو هجوم نووي شنته الولايات المتحدة ضد الإمبراطورية اليابانية في نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية في أغسطس 1945، قامت الولايات المتحدة بقصف مدينتي هيروشيما وناجازاكي باستخدام قنابل نووية بسبب رفض تنفيذ إعلان مؤتمر بوتسدام وكان نصه أن تستسلم اليابان استسلاما كاملا بدون أي شروط، إلا أن رئيس الوزراء الياباني سوزوكي رفض هذا التقرير وتجاهل المهلة التي حدَّدها إعلان بوتسدام. وبموجب الأمر التنفيذي الذي أصدره الرئيس هاري ترومان، قامت الولايات المتحدة بإطلاق السلاح النووي الولد الصغير على مدينة هيروشيما (يوم الاثنين 27 شعبان عام 1364 هـ / الموافق 6 أغسطس عام 1945 م).[2][3] ثم تلاها إطلاق قنبلة الرجل البدين على مدينة ناجازاكي في التاسع من شهر أغسطس. وكانت هذه الهجمات هي الوحيدة التي تمت باستخدام الأسلحة النووية في تاريخ الحرب.[4]

قتلت القنابل ما يصل إلى 140،000 شخص في هيروشيما، و80،000 في ناغازاكي بحلول نهاية عام 1945، [5] حيث مات ما يقرب من نصف هذا الرقم في نفس اليوم الذي تمت فيه التفجيرات. ومن بين هؤلاء، مات 15-20 ٪ متأثرين بالجروح أو بسبب آثار الحروق، والصدمات، والحروق الإشعاعية، يضاعفها الأمراض، وسوء التغذية والتسمم الإشعاعي.[6] ومنذ ذلك الحين، توفي عدد كبير بسبب سرطان الدم (231 حالة) والسرطانات الصلبة (334 حالة)، تأتي نتيجة التعرض للإشعاعات المنبثقة من القنابل.[7] وكانت معظم الوفيات من المدنيين في المدينتين.[8][9][10]

وبعد ستة أيام من تفجير القنبلة على ناغازاكي، في الخامس عشر من أغسطس، أعلنت اليابان استسلامها لقوات الحلفاء. حيث وقعت وثيقة الاستسلام في الثاني من شهر سبتمبر، مما أنهي الحرب في المحيط الهادئ رسمياً، ومن ثم نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية. كما وقعت ألمانيا [3] وثيقة الاستسلام في السابع من مايو، مما أنهى الحرب في أوروبا. وجعلت التفجيرات اليابان تعتمد المباديء الثلاثة غير النووية بعد الحرب، والتي تمنع الأمة من التسلح النووي.[11]

محتويات

خلفية عامةعدل

مشروع مانهاتنعدل

قامت الولايات المتحدة بالتعاون مع المملكة المتحدة وكندا خلال مشاريعهم السرية: Tube Alloys ومختبرات نهر تشوك، [12][13] بتصميم وبناء أول قنبلة نووية في إطار مشروع مانهاتن. وقام الفيزيائي الأمريكي روبرت أوبنهايمر بإدارة البحث العلمي. صُنعت قنبلة هيروشيما، وهي قنبلة ذات انشطار مُصوَّب تسمى بـ"ليتل بوي"، من اليورانيوم 235. وهو نظير نادر لليورانيوم. وتم اختبار القنبلة الذرية للمرة الأولى في ترينيتي، في السادس عشر من شهر يوليو عام 1945، بالقرب من ألاموغوردو، نيو مكسيكو. يعد سلاح ال"gadget" وقنبلة ناغازاكي "فات مان" من الأنواع ذات الانشطار الداخلي، وتم صناعتهما من البلوتونيوم 239، وهو عنصر اصطناعي.[14]

اختيار الأهدافعدل

 
خريطة تبين موقع هيروشيما وناغازاكي في اليابان، حيث سقطت القنبلتين النوويتين.

وفي العاشر والحادي عشر من شهر مايو عام 1945، رشحت لجنة تحديد الهدف في لوس ألاموس، بقيادة روبرت أوبنهايمر، كيوتو، وهيروشيما، ويوكوهاما، وكوكورا كأهداف محتملة. واعتمد اختيار الهدف على المعايير التالية:

  • يجب أن يكون قطر الهدف أكثر من ثلاثة أميال وهدفاً مهماً في منطقة حضرية كبيرة.
  • يجب أن يؤدي الانفجار إلى أضرار فعلية.
  • أن يكون من المستبعد الهجوم على الهدف في شهر أغسطس عام 1945. "يجب على أي هدف عسكري صغير ودقيق أن يقع في منطقة كبيرة لتتعرض للأضرار الناجمة عن الانفجار، ومن أجل تجنب مخاطر الأسلحة النووية التي لا داعي لها، وفقدها نتيجة وضع القنبلة في المكان الخاطيء." [15]

لم تتأثر هذه المدن خلال الغارات الليلية وهجمات الجيش، ووافق سلاح الطيران على حذفهم من القائمة المستهدفة حتى يتم تقييم السلاح بدقة. وكانت هيروشيما توصف بأنها "مستودع عسكري هام وميناء يمكن المغادرة من خلالها في وسط منطقة صناعية حضرية. كما أنها هدف راداري مهم، وحجمها كبير بحيث سيتعرض جزء كبير من المدينة لأضرار جسيمة. وستؤدي التلال المجاورة إلى إحداث تأثير تركيزي، ومن ثم زيادة ضرر الانفجار. ولكن وجود الأنهار لا يجعلها هدفاً مثيراً للنيران." [15] كان الهدف من استخدام هذا السلاح هو إقناع اليابان للاستسلام دون شروط، وفقاً لما جاء في إعلان بوتسدام. وذكرت لجنة تحديد الأهداف أن "للعوامل النفسية أهمية كبيرة في اختيار الهدف. ومن هذه الجوانب: (1) التأثير النفسي على اليابان بقدر المستطاع، (2) وجعل الاستخدام الأولي للسلاح مثيراً، وذلك ليعترف العالم أجمع بأهميته عندما يتم إطلاقه. وفي هذا الصدد، يتمتع أهل كيوتو بدرجة عالية من الذكاء، وبالتالي هم أكثر قدرة على تقدير أهمية هذا السلاح. بينما تتمتع هيروشيما بحجمها الكبير والجبال القريبة، ومن ثم يمكن تدمير جزء كبير من المدينة. ويحظى قصر الإمبراطور في طوكيو بشهرة أكبر من أي هدف آخر، ولكنه ذات قيمة استراتيجية أقل.[15]

وخلال الحرب العالمية الثانية، كان إدوين رايشاور خبير اليابان المسئول عن مخابرات الجيش الأمريكي، ويعتقد البعض خطأً بأنه تمكن من منع الهجوم على مدينة كيوتو.[16] ففي سيرته الذاتية، دحض راشاور هذا الإدعاء المشهور قائلاً:

"...إن هنري ستيمسون، وزير الحرب آنذاك، هو الشخص الوحيد الذي يستحق التقدير لإنقاذ مدينة كيوتو من الدمار، فقد أٌعجب بمدينة كيوتو منذ عقود قليلة حيث قضى شهر العسل هناك." [17]

إنذار بوتسدامعدل

في السادس والعشرين من شهر يوليو، أصدر ترومان وغيره من زعماء التحالف إعلان بوتسدام الذي يحدد شروط استسلام اليابان. وقد تم تقديمه بمثابة بلاغ نهائي. فإذا لم تستسلم اليابان، سيهاجم الحلفاء البلاد وسيؤدي ذلك إلى "التدمير الحتمي والكامل للقوات المسلحة اليابانية والوطن بأكمله". ولم يذكر البيان أي شيء عن القنبلة الذرية. وفي الثامن والعشرين من شهر يوليو، أعلنت الصحف اليابانية أن الحكومة قد رفضت إعلان بوتسدام. وفي ظهر ذلك اليوم، أعلن رئيس الوزراء كانتارو سوزوكي في مؤتمر صحفي أن إعلان بوتسدام عبارة عن إعادة صياغة (yakinaoshi) لإعلان القاهرة، ومن ثم تجاهلته الحكومة عمداً (mokusatsu "قتله بالصمت").[18] واعتبرت الصحف اليابانية والأجنبية هذا التصريح بمثابة رفض واضح للإعلان. ولم يسعى الإمبراطور هيروهيتو لتغيير موقف الحكومة. وكان ينتظر الرد السوفياتي على النوايا اليابانية المبهمة نحو السلام.[19] وفي الحادي والثلاثين من شهر يوليو، صرح الإمبراطور لمستشاره كويتشي كيدو أنه يجب الدفاع عن الرموز الإمبراطورية اليابانية بأي ثمن.[20]

وفي مطلع شهر يوليو، أعاد ترومان النظر في استخدام القنبلة النووية أثناء ذهابه إلى مدينة بوتسدام. وفي النهاية، قرر ترومان مهاجمة اليابان باستخدام القنابل النووية. أعلن ترومان عن نيته في إصدار أوامره بشن الهجوم بحجة إنهاء هذه الحرب سريعاً عن طريق إلحاق الدمار وزرع الخوف داخل الشعب الياباني، ومن ثم إرغام البلاد على الاستسلام.[21]

هيروشيماعدل

هيروشيما خلال الحرب العالمية الثانيةعدل

 
طائرة الإينولا جاي وطاقمها، التي أسقطت القنبلة "الولد الصغير" على مدينة هيروشيما.

كانت مدينة هيروشيما تتمتع ببعض الأهمية الصناعية والعسكرية في الوقت الذي تم تدميرها فيه. فكان هناك عدد من معسكرات الجيش، بما في ذلك مقر الشعبة الخامسة والمقر العام الثاني للجيش الخاص بالمشير شونروكو هاتا المسئول عن الدفاع عن جميع الأجزاء الجنوبية في اليابان. كما كانت هيروشيما مُزَوِّد ثانوي وقاعدة لوجستية للجيش الياباني. وكانت المدينة مركزاً للاتصالات، ونقطة تخزين، ومنطقة تجميع للقوات. وكانت المدينة واحدة من المدن اليابانية العديدة التي كانت بمنأى عن القصف الأميركي، مما جعل أهلها يستشعرون الضرر الناجم عن القنبلة الذرية بحرقة شديدة.  [بحاجة لمصدر]

يقع في وسط المدينة عدة بنايات خرسانية قوية وهياكل أخف وزناً. وخارج المركز، تزدحم المنطقة بمجموعة من ورش العمل الخشبية الصغيرة التي تقع بين البيوت اليابانية. كما نجد بعض النباتات الصناعية التي تقع بالقرب من ضواحي المدينة. بُنِيَت البيوت من الخشب وكُسِيَت الأسقف بالآجر، وتم بناء كثير من المباني الصناعية على إطارات خشبية. وبالتالي، فإن المدينة بأكملها سريعة التأثر بالنيران.

وصل عدد سكان هيروشيما إلى ذروته لأكثر من 381،000 نسمة في أوائل الحرب، ولكنه انخفض باطراد قبل القصف الذري بسبب الإخلاء المنهجي الذي قامت به الحكومة اليابانية. تراوح عدد السكان في وقت الهجوم بين حوالي 340،000-350،000.[5] ويظل عدد السكان آنذاك غير مؤكداً بسبب إحراق الوثائق الرسمية.

القصفعدل

لمعرفة تشكيل بعثة سلاح القوات الجوية الأمريكية، أنظر المجموعة رقم 509.

كانت هيروشيما الهدف الأساسي للتفجير النووي في السادس من شهر أغسطس، بينما كانت كوكورا أو ناغازاكي الهدف الآخر. ولقد تم اختيار السادس من شهر لأن الغيوم قد سبق وأن حجبت الهدف. انطلق سرب الطائرات 393d B29 إينولا جاي من القاعدة الجوية الشمالية بجزيرة تينيان، غرب المحيط الأطلسي. وكان يقوده قائد المجموعة رقم 509 الكولونيل بول تيبتس. ورافق إينولا جاي (التي سميت باسم أم الكولونيل تيبتس) اثنين من الB29. قامت القاذفة الأولى وتسمى الفنان الكبير، بقيادة الرائد تشارلز دبليو سويني، بنقل المعدات؛ بالإضافة إلى طائرة أخرى سميت بعد ذلك بالشر الضروري (طائرة التصوير الضوئي)، والتي كان يقودها الكابتن جورج ماركوارت.[22]

وبعد مغادرة جزيرة تينيان، اتخذت كل طائرة طريقها على حدى إلى لايو جيما، حيث تقابلا على ارتفاع 2440 متر (8000 قدم) وانطلقا إلى اليابان.2,440 متر (8,010 ft) وصلت الطائرة إلى الهدف، وكانت الرؤية واضحة على ارتفاع 9855 متر (32330 قدم). 9,855 متر (32,333 ft) وأثناء الرحلة، قام الكابتن وليام بارسونز بتسليح القنبلة، حيث لم يكن تم تسليحها بعد لتقليل المخاطر أثناء الإقلاع. وأزال مساعد الكابتن، اللفتنانت الثاني موريس جيبسون، أجهزة السلامة قبل الوصول إلى الهدف بثلاثين دقيقة.[23]

 
كانت الطاقة المنبعثة قوية جداً بما يكفي لاختراق الملابس. إن الأجزاء السوداء في الملبس الذي يرتديه الضحية وقت وقوع الانفجار انتشرت على الجسد.

وقبل الانفجار بحوالي ساعة، اكتشف رادار الإنذار الياباني اقتراب بعض الطائرات الأمريكية من الجزء الجنوبي الياباني. وتم تنبيه البلاد، وتوقف البث الإذاعي في مدن كثيرة، من بينها مدينة هيروشيما. وقرابة الساعة الثامنة صباحاً، حدد الرادار في مدينة هيروشيما اليابانية عدد الطائرات القادمة بأنه لا يتعدى الثلاث طائرات، ومن ثم تم رفع حالة التأهب. وللحفاظ على الوقود والطائرات، قرر اليابانيون عدم اعتراض مثل هذه التجمعات الصغيرة. حذَّرت الإذاعة الناس أنه قد يكون من المستحسن الذهاب إلى ملاجئ تحميهم من الغارات الجوية إذا ما شاهدوا الطائرات B 29 تقترب، ولم يتوقعوا حدوث أي غارات حيث اعتقدوا أن الطائرات في رحلة استطلاعية فقط.

انطلقت القنبلة الساعة الثامنة والربع (بتوقيت هيروشيما) كما كان مخطط، وهي قنبلة تعمل بقوة الجاذبية تسمى "ليتل بوي"، كما أنها قنبلة ذات انشطار مُصَوَّب. وتحمل 60 كيلوجراماً (130 باوند) من اليورانيوم 235. واستغرقت القنبلة 57 ثانية لتسقط من الطائرة وتصل إلى الارتفاع الذي ستنفجر فيه، وهو حوالي 600 متر (2000 قدم) فوق المدينة.60 كيلوغرام (130 رطل)600 متر (2,000 ft) حولت القنبلة مسارها بحوالي 800 قدم (240 متر) بسبب الرياح المتعامدة، لتسقط على عيادة شيما للجراحة بدلاً من الهدف المخطط له، وهو جسر أيوي. ونتج عن ذلك انفجار يعادل حوالي 13 كيلوطن من الTNT أو 13 كيلوطن من تي أن تي (54 تـجول)(54 JT). (ويعتبر سلاح اليو 235 غير فعال، حيث يتشطر 1.38 ٪ فقط من المواد المكونة له.) [24] وبلغ نصف قطر دائرة الدمار نحو ميل واحد (1.6 كم)، بالإضافة إلى الحرائق التي انتشرت في أنحاء مختلفة على مساحة 4.4 ميل مكعب تقريباً (11 كيلومتر مكعب).[25] وتشير التقديرات الأمريكية إلى تدمير 4.7 ميل مكعب (12 كيلومتر مكعب) من مساحة المدينة. بينما حدد المسؤولون اليابانيون خسارة المباني في هيروشيما بـ69 ٪، بالإضافة إلى إلحاق الضرر بـ6-7 ٪ من مباني أخرى.[6]

لَقِىَ 70،000-80،000 شخص، أي حوالي 30 ٪ [26] من سكان هيروشيما، حَتْفَهٌم على الفور، وجُرِحَ 70،000 آخرون.[27] كما مات أكثر من 90 ٪ من الأطباء و93 ٪ من الممرضين في هيروشيما أو اصيبوا بجروح، حيث كان معظمهم في منطقة وسط المدينة التي تأثرت بالانفجار أكثر من أي منطقة أخرى.[28]

على الرغم من أن الولايات المتحدة قد سبق وألقت منشورات تُحذر فيها المدنيين من الغارات الجوية على اثنتى عشر مدينة يابانية أخرى، [29] لم يتم تحذير سكان هيروشيما من إسقاط القنبلة الذرية.[30][31][32]

إدراك اليابانيين بحدوث الانفجارعدل

   
هيروشيما قبل حدوث الإنفجار.
هيروشيما بعد حدوث الإنفجار.

لاحظ مشغل التحكم بطوكيو، التابع لهيئة الإذاعة اليابانية، اختفاء محطة هيروشيما. ومن ثم حاول إعادة بناء برنامجه باستخدام خط هاتفي آخر، ولكن باءت محاولته بالفشل.[33] وبعد حوالي عشرين دقيقة، أَيقن مركز تلغراف السكك الحديدية بطوكيو تَوَقُف الخط الرئيسي للتلغراف عن العمل شمال مدينة هيروشيما. وبعد توقف بعض السكك الحديدية على بعد 16 كم (10 ميل) من المدينة، جاءت تقارير غير رسمية تتحدث عن حدوث انفجار رهيب في مدينة هيروشيما. وتم نقل كل هذه التقارير إلى مقر قيادة هيئة الأركان العامة للجيش الياباني الإمبراطوري.

وحاولت القواعد العسكرية مراراً الاتصال بمحطة مراقبة الجيش بمدينة هيروشيما. وأدهش ذلك الصمت التام للمدينة الرجال في المقر؛ فهم يعلمون أنه لا يوجد أي غارات من قبل العدو، ولا يوجد أي مخزون من المتفجرات في مدينة هيروشيما آنذاك. وصدرت الأوامر إلى ضابط شاب من هيئة الأركان العامة اليابانية كي يغادر فوراً إلى هيروشيما، ليهبط بالطائرة على الأرض، ويمسح المنطقة، ثم يعود إلى طوكيو ومعه معلومات موثوق بها للهيئة. فكان هناك شعور عام في المقر بأنه لم يحدث شيئاً خطيراً، وأن الانفجار لا يعد سوى شائعة سخيفة.

تَوَجًّه الضابط إلى المطار، وأَقلعت الطائرة مُتجِهة إلى جنوب غرب البلاد. وبعد الطيران لمدة ثلاث ساعات تقريباً، وقبل الوصول إلى هيروشيما بحوالي مائة ميل (160 كم)، رأي الضابط والطيار سحابة كبيرة من الدخان نتيجة سقوط القنبلة. وفي فترة ما بعد الظهر، كان ما تبقى من هيروشيما مشتعلاً. وسرعان ما وصلت طائرتهم إلي المدينة، وأخذوا يطوفون فوقها في حالة من عدم التصديق. وكان هناك قطعة كبيرة من الأرض لا تزال مشتعلة، تغطيها سحابة كبيرة من الدخان. وكان ذلك كل ما تبقى من المدينة المنكوبة. هبطت الطائرة جنوب المدينة، وقام الضابط على الفور بتنظيم وسائل الإغاثة، بعد أن أبلغ طوكيو بما شاهد.

وبحلول اليوم الثامن من شهر أغسطس عام 1945، ذكرت الصحف الأمريكية أن هناك تقارير من الإذاعة اليابانية تقوم بوصف الدمار الذي لحق بمدينة هيروشيما. "من الناحية العملية جميع الكائنات الحية، الإنسان والحيوان، وكانت حرفيا أخدودا حتى الموت ،" مذيعات الاذاعة اليابانية قال في رسالة بثها تلقتها مصادر الحلفاء.[34]

ما بعد الهجومعدل

وفقاً لمعظم التقديرات، أدى الانفجار إلى مقتل ما يقرب من 70،000 شخص في الحال بمدينة هيروشيما. وتشير التقديرات إلى أن مجموع الوفيات بحلول نهاية عام 1945 نتيجة الحروق، والإشعاعات، والأمراض ذات صلة، والآثار التي تفاقمت بسبب نقص الموارد الطبية، يتراوح بين 90،000 إلى 140،000 شخص.[5][35] وتشير بعض التقديرات الأخرى إلى وفاة 200،000 شخص بحلول عام 1950، بسبب السرطان وغيره من الآثار طويلة المدى.[2][8][36] بينما ذكرت دراسة أخرى أن ما يقرب من 9 ٪ من الوفيات بسبب سرطان الدم بين الناجين من القنبلة بين عام 1950 وعام 1990، نتج من الإشعاع الصادر من هذه القنابل. وتُقدر الإحصاءات وجود 89 حالة لوكيميا و339 حالة سرطانات صلبة في ذلك الوقت.[37] كما مات على الأقل أحد عشر من أسرى الحرب المعروفين جراء القصف.[38]

نجاة بعض الهياكلعدل

 
Small-scale recreation of the Nakajima area around ground zero

لم تتأثر بعض المباني الخرسانية الصلبة في هيروشيما كثيراً، حيث أنها شُيدت بطريقة قوية جدا لتحمل مخاطر الزلازل في اليابان، وبالتالي لم يتعرض هيكلها للانهيار، على الرغم من أنها كانت قريبة إلى حدٍ ما من مركز الانفجار. ويعتبر إيزاو نامورا (野村 英三, Nomura Eizō) أقرب الناجين شهرةً، والذي كان في سرداب أحد المباني الصلبه (سميت ب"بيوت الراحة" بعد الحرب) على بعد 170 متر فقط (560 قدم) من مركز الانفجار وقت الهجوم[39]. بالإضافة إلى اكيكو تاكاكورا (高蔵 信子, Takakura Akiko) التي كانت من بين الناجين الذين تواجدوا بالقرب من مركز الانفجار. حيث كانت داخل بنك هيروشيما على بعد 300 متر (980 قدم) فقط من مركز الانفجار وقت الهجوم.[40] وبما أن الانفجار قد حدث في الهواء، تم توجيه الانفجار نحو الأسفل أكثر منه على الجانبين، مما أدى إلى نجاة قبة غنباكو، أو قبة القنبلة النووية. صمم هذا المبنى وصنع من قبل المهندس المعماري التشيكي جان ليتسل، وكان يبعد عن مركز القنبلة بـ150 متر (490 قدم) فقط. وسميت هذه الأنقاض باسم نصب السلام التذكاري بهيروشيما، وأصبح موقعاً للتراث العالمي تابعاً لمنظمة اليونسكو في عام 1996، على الرغم من اعتراضات الولايات المتحدة والصين.[41]

أحداث 7-9 أغسطسعدل

بعد قصف هيروشيما، أعلن الرئيس ترومان قائلاً:

إذا لم يقبلوا بشروطنا، يجب أن يتوقعوا أمطاراً من الخراب تأتيهم من الهواء، لم يراها أحدٌ من قبل على هذه الأرض.

لم ترد الحكومة اليابانية على إعلان بوتسدام بعد. كان كل من الإمبراطور هيروهيتو، والحكومة، ومجلس الحرب يبحث أربعة شروط للاستسلام: الحفاظ على الـكوكوتاي (وهو المؤسسة الإمبراطورية ونظام الحكم الوطني)، وتَوَلِّي المقر الإمبراطوري مسؤولية نزع السلاح والتسريح، ولا يجب احتلال أيٍ من الجزر اليابانية، أو كوريا، أو تايوان، ويجب معاقبة مجرمي الحرب بواسطة الحكومة اليابانية.[42]

أبلغ مولوتوف، وزير الخارجية السوفياتي، طوكيو بإنهاء الإتحاد السوفياتي للحلف الحيادي السوفيتي الياباني في الخامس من شهر إبريل. وبعد منتصف الليل بدقيقتين في التاسع من شهر أغسطس بتوقيت طوكيو، شنَّ الإتحاد السوفياتي عملية الهجوم الاستراتيجي على منشوريا باستخدام المشاة والمُدرَّعات والقوات الجوِّية. وبعد مرور أربع ساعات، علمت طوكيو بأن الإتحاد السوفيتي قد أعلن الحرب على اليابان. بدأت القيادة العليا للجيش الياباني استعداداتها لفرض الأحكام العرفية على البلاد، وذلك بدعم من وزير الحرب كوريتشيكا أنامى، من أجل وقف أي محاولة نحو السلام.

كانت مسؤولية تحديد توقيت التفجير الثاني تقع على عاتق الكولونيل تيبتس، باعتباره قائد الفرقة رقم 509 في تينيان. كان من المقرر شن الهجوم على مدينة كوكورا في الحادي عشر من شهر أغسطس، ولكن تم تقرير الهجمة قبل ذلك بيومين لتجنب فترة من الطقس السيء ستبدأ في العاشر من شهر أغسطس وتستمر لمدة خمسة أيام.[43] تم نقل ثلاث قنابل مُجَمَّعة إلى تينيان، وسميت القنابل F-31، وF-32، وF-33. وفي الثامن من شهر أغسطس، أجري الميجر تشارلز سويني بروفة في تينان مستخدماً طائرة الBockscar. استمر اختبار الF-33 وخصصت الF-31 لمهمة التاسع من شهر أغسطس.[44]

ناغازاكيعدل

ناغازاكي خلال الحرب العالمية الثانيةعدل

 
الطائرة Bockscar وطاقمها، التي أسقطت القنبلة "الرجل البدين" على ناغازاكي.

كانت مدينة ناغازاكي واحدة من أكبر الموانيء البحرية التي تقع جنوب اليابان. وكان لها أهمية استراتيجية كبيرة بسبب نشاطها الصناعي، حيث كانت تُنتج الذخائر، والسفن، والمًعدَّات العسكرية، والمواد الحربية الأخرى.

وعلى عكس العديد من الجوانب الحديثة في مدينة هيروشيما، كانت جميع المباني في ناغازاكي مبنيِّة على الطراز الياباني القديم، حيث تتألف من الأخشاب (مع أو بدون لاصق) والأسقف المكسوة بالآجر. كما كان العديد من المنشآت التجارية والصناعية مصنوعة من الخشب أو غيره من المواد التي لا تتحمل الانفجارات. تمكنت ناغازاكي من النمو لسنوات عديدة دون أن تخضع إلى أي خطة تقسيم; وشُيدت المساكن بِجوار المباني الصناعية. وتقع قريبة من بعضها البعض قدر المستطاع في جميع أنحاء الوادي الصناعي.

لم تتعرض ناغازاكي لقصف عنيف قبل ضربها بالأسلحة النووية. في الأول من شهر أغسطس عام 1945، سقط عدد من القنابل التقليدية شديدة الانفجار على المدينة. ضرب عدد قليل من القنابل أحواض بناء السفن ومناطق تحميل وتفريغ السفن في الجزء الجنوبي الغربي من المدينة، بيتما أصابت عدة قنابل مصانع ميتسوبيشي للصلب والأسلحة. كما أنهالت ست قنابل على كلية الطب بناغازاكي والمستشفى، وتعرضت المباني لثلاث ضربات مباشرة. على الرغم من أن الضرر الناجم عن هذه القنابل كان ضئيلاً نسبياً، فقد خلق ذلك قلقاً كبيراً في ناغازاكي بين كثير من الناس، وخاصة على مدارس الأطفال. وبالتالي، تم نقل الأطفال إلى المناطق الريفية من أجل سلامتهم، ومن ثم خفض عدد السكان في المدينة في وقت الهجوم النووي.

يقع في شمال ناغازاكي معسكر يحتجز أسرى حرب الكومنولث البريطاني، وكان بعضهم يعمل في مناجم الفحم، ولم يعرفوا شيئاً عن الانفجارات إلا عندما عادوا إلى السطح.

القصفعدل

لمعرفة المزيد عن لتشكيل بعثة سلاح الطيران الأمريكي، أنظر الفرقة رقم 509.
 
نموذج لقنبلة "الرجل البدين".

وفي صباح اليوم التاسع من شهر أغسطس عام 1945، أقلعت القاذفة الأمريكية B-29 Bockscar بقيادة الميجور تشارلز دبليو سويني، وهي تحمل القنبلة النووية التي اطلق عليها اسم "الرجل البدين"، متجهة إلى [[كوكورا{/0 باعتبارها الهدف الرئيسي، ثم إلى {0}ناغازاكي]] باعتبارها الهدف الثانوي. كانت خطة القيام بالهجوم الثاني مطابقة تقريباً لهجوم هيروشيما. تكوَّن السرب من طائرتين B-29 انطلقوا قبل الهجوم بساعة لاسكشاف الطقس، واثنتين إضافيتان بقيادة سويني لحمل آلات التصوير وتقديم الدعم للبعثة. طار سويني بالقنبلة التي تم تسليحها، ولكنه لم يزيل مقباس السلامة.[45]

أَقَرَّ المراقبون الجوِّيُون بأن كلا الهدفين واضحين. وعندما وصل سويني إلى نقطة التجمع قبالة ساحل اليابان، فشلت الطائرة الثالثة Big Stink في اللحاق بهم. وكان يقودها رئيس العمليات اللفتنانت كولونيل جيمس هوبكنز الابن. وظلت الطائرة Bockscar وطائرة الأجهزة تحلقان لمدة أربعين دقيقة من دون تحديد مكان هوبكنز. وبما أنهم تأخروا لمدة 30 دقيقة عن الموعد المقرر، قرر سويني الطيران بدون هوبكنز.[45]

 
ناغازاكي قبل وبعد التفجير.

وعندما وصلوا إلى Kokura متأخرىن بنصف ساعة، كان هناك سح 70 ٪ من الغطاء السحابي كانت تحجب المدينة، والتي تحظر الهجوم البصرية اللازمة من أوامر. وبعد القيام بثلاث جولات فوق سماء المدينة، بدأ الوقود ينفذ بسبب فشل نقل الطائرة على الخزان الاحتياطي قبل الإقلاع. ومن ثم اتخذت الطائرات طريقها إلى الهدف الثانوي، ناغازاكي.[45] أشارت حسابات استهلاك الوقود إلى أن الطائرة Bockscar ليس لديها وقود يكفي للوصول إلى ايو جيما، وسوف تضطر إلى تحويل إلى اوكيناوا. قررت المجموعة مبدئياً حَمْل القنبلة إلى أوكيناوا والتخلص منها في المحيط إذا لزم الأمر، إذا كان هناك سحب تحجب رؤية ناغازاكي عند الوصول إليها. ثم قرر القائد البحري فريدريك آشوورث استخدام الرادار إذا كان الهدف غير واضح.[46]

وفي حوالي الساعة 07:50 بتوقيت اليابان، كان هناك حالة تأهب للغارة الجوية على ناغازاكي، ولكن تم إعطاء الإشارة الواضحة في الساعة 08:30. وعندما اِكْتُشِفَت القاذفتين B-29 في الساعة 10:53، اِعْتَقَدَ اليابانيون بأن الطائرتين يَقُمْنَ برحلة استطلاعية، ومن ثم توقف نداء الخطر.

وبعد مرور بضع دقائق، وفي تمام الساعة 11:00، أسقطت الطائرة The Great Artiste من طراز B-29 بقيادة الكابتن فريدريك بوك، صكوك معلقة على ثلاث مظلات. تحتوي هذه الصكوك على رسالة غير موقعة للبروفيسور ريوكيتشي ساجاني، عالم الفيزياء النووية بجامعة طوكيو الذي درس مع ثلاثة من العلماء المسؤولين عن القنبلة الذرية في جامعة كاليفورنيا في بيركلي. تَحُث تلك الرسالة البروفيسور أن يُعَرِّف الشعب بالمخاطر الكامنة في استخدام أسلحة الدمار الشامل هذه. عثرت السلطات العسكرية على تلك الرسائل، ولم يتم تسليمها إلى ساجاني إلى بعد مرور شهر.[47] وفي عام 1949، تقابل أحد كتَّاب هذه الرسالة، لويس الفاريز، مع ساجاني، ووَقَّع على الرسالة.[48]

 
تقرير ياباني عن القصف يمثل ناغازاكي بأنها "مقبرة ليس لها بلاطة ضريح".

وفي الساعة 11:01، تمكن الكابتن كيرميت بيهان من رؤية الهدف في آخر دقيقة من انكسار السحب فوق ناغازاكي.سقط "الرجل البدين"، الذي يحتوي على 6.4 كيلوغرام (14.1 باوند) من البلوتونيوم 239، على الوادي الصناعي بالمدينة. وبعد مرور ثلاثة وأربعين ثانية، انفجرت القنبلة على ارتفاع 469 متر (1،540 قدم) فوق سطح الأرض، تحديداً في منتصف المسافة بين شركة ميتسوبيشي للصلب والأسلحة في الجنوب ومصنع ميتسوبيشي Urakami للذخائر (التوربيدو) في الشمال. وكان ذلك على بعد 3 كيلومتر (2 ميل) تقريباً شمال غرب المركز المخطط؛ اقتصر الانفجار على وادي أوراكامي، بينما حمت التلال جزء كبير من المدينة.[49] ووصلت قوة الانفجار إلى ما يعادل 21 كيلوطن من الTNT وهو ما يعادل 21 كيلوطن من تي أن تي (88 تـجول)  [بحاجة لمصدر](88 TJ). وقُدِّرَت الطاقة الحرارية التي ولَّدَها الانفجار بـ3،900 درجة مئوية (4،200 كلفن، 7،000 درجة فهرنهايت)، بينما بلغت قوة الرياح إلى 1005 كم/ساعة (624 ميل في الساعة).

تراوح عدد الوفيات المباشرة بين 40،000 و75،000 شخص.[50][51][52] ووصل إجمالي عدد الوفيات بنهاية عام 1945 80،000 شخص.[5] مات ما لا يقل عن ثمانية من أسرى الحرب من جراء القصف، بالإضافة إلى مصرع ثلاثة عشر أسير آخرون:

  • مواطن تابع للكومنولث البريطاني [53][54][55][56][57]
  • لقي سبعة أسرى هولنديون (اثنين من الأسماء المعروفة) [58] حتفهم في القصف.
  • سُجِّل موت ما لا يقل عن اثنين من الأسرى بعد الحرب بسبب السرطان، ويُعْتَقَد أن يكون ذلك نتيجة القنبلة الذرية.[59] بلغ نصف قطر دائرة الدمار حوالي ميل (1-2 كم)، يليها حرائق منتشرة في الجزء الشمالي من المدينة على بعد ميلين (3 كم) من جنوب القنبلة.[60][61]

هرب عدد مجهول من الناجين من قصف هيروشيما إلى ناغازاكي، حيث تعرضوا للقصف مرة أخرى.[62][63]

وتم تدمير مصنع ميتسوبيشي - أوراكامي للذخائر أثناء القصف. وكان ذلك المصنع ينتج الطوربيدات 91 التي هاجمت ميناء بيرل.[64]

 
تشير العلامة السوداء على "نقطة الصفر" لانفجار القنبلة النووية فوق ناغازاكي.

خطط لمزيد من الهجمات النووية على اليابانعدل

توقعت الولايات المتحدة استخدام قنبلة نووية أخرى في الأسبوع الثالث من شهر أغسطس، بالإضافة إلى ثلاثة آخرين في شهر سبتمبر، وثلاثة قنابل إضافية في شهر أكتوبر.[65] وفي العاشر من شهر أغسطس، أرسل الجنرال ليسلي غروفز، المدير العسكري لمشروع مانهاتن، مذكرة إلى الفريق أول جورج مارشيل، رئيس أركان الجيش، حيث كتب فيها: "ينبغي أن تكون القنبلة القادمة جاهزة للتسليم في أول فرصة يكون فيها الطقس مناسباً، بعد السابع عشر أو الثامن عشر من شهر أغسطس." وفي نفس اليوم، وَقَّع مارشال على المُذكِّرة مُعَلِّقًا: "لن يتم إطلاقها على اليابان إلا بإذن صريح من الرئيس." [65] وكان هناك بالفعل مناقشات في وزارة الحرب حول حفظ القنابل قيد الإنتاج حتى بداية الغزو المتوقع لليابان. "على فرض بأن اليابان لن تستسلم، فإن المشكلة الآن [أغسطس 13] تكمن في إما مواصلة إسقاط القنابل واحدة واحدة، أو إطلاقهم جميعاٌ في وقت قصير. لن نطلقهم جميعاً في يوم واحد، ولكن خلال فترة قصيرة. ويجب أيضاً أخذ الهدف الذي نسعى إليه في الاعتبار. ألا ينبغي علينا التركيز على الأهداف التي ستساعدنا على الغزو بقدر كبير، بدلاً من الصناعة، ورفع المعنويات، وعلم النفس، وما شابه؟ فاستخدام التكتيك خيرٌ من أي وسيلة أخرى.[65]

استسلام اليابان واحتلالهاعدل

كن مجلس الحرب لا يزال مُصِرّاً على شروطه الأربعة للاستسلام حتى التاسع من شهر أغسطس. وفي ذلك اليوم، أمر هيروهيتو كيدو "بالسيطرة على الموقف بسرعة... لأن الاتحاد السوفيتي قد أعلن الحرب علينا". ثم عقد مؤتمر إمبراطوري، وكلَّف الوزير توجو بإخطار الحلفاء بأن اليابان ستقبل شروطهم بشرط واحد: لا يشمل الإعلان أي طلب تحيزي لصلاحيات جلالة الإمبراطور كحاكم سيادي." [66]

وفي الثاني عشر من شهر أغسطس، أبلغ الإمبراطور العائلة الإمبراطورية بقراره بالاستسلام. وسئله أحد أعمامه، الأمير أساكا، عما إذا كانت الحرب ستستمر في حالة عدم القدرة على الحفاظ على kokutai. وأجاب هيروهيتو ببساطة: "بالطبع." [67] وبما أن شروط الحلفاء لن تمس مبدأ الحفاظ على العرش، هيروهيتو سجلت في 14 آب إعلانه الاستسلام الذي تم بثه على الامة اليابانية في اليوم التالي رغم تمرد قصيرة على يد العسكريين المعارضين للاستسلام.

وأشار هيروهيتو في تصريحاته إلى القصف النووي:

يملك العدو سلاحاً جديد ومريب يستطيع حصد العديد من الأرواح البريئة وتدمير البلاد. فإذا استكلمنا القتال، سيؤدي ذلك إلى القضاء على اليابانيين والحضارة الإنسانية ككل. وبالتالي، كيف لنا أن نحمى ملايين المواطنين من الموت المحتوم؟ ولذلك، فقد قمنا بإعلان استسلامنا.

أما في "رسالته إلى الجنود والبحارة" التي سَلَّمَهَا في السابع عشر من شهر أغسطس، شَدَّدَ الإمبراطور على أثر الغزو السوفياتي وعلى قراره بالاستسلام، ولم يَذكُر أي شيء عن القنابل.

وفي السنة التالية للانفجارات، احتل نحو 40،000 من القوات الأمريكية هيروشيما، بينما احتل 27،000 جندي مدينة ناغازاكي.

لجنة ضحايا القنبلة النوويةعدل

في ربيع عام 1948، تأسست لجنة ضحايا القنبلة النووية (ABCC) وفقاً لتوجيهات رئاسية من هاري ترومان إلى الأكاديمية الوطنية للعلوم والمجلس الوطني للبحوث، لإجراء تحقيقات حول آثار الإشعاعات على الناجين من قصف هيروشيما وناغازاكي. تم العثور على العديد من الضحايا غير المقصودة، بما في ذلك أسرى الحروب التابعيين للحلفاء، وكوريا، والعمال الصينيين، وطلاب من ملايو، وحوالي 3200 مواطن أمريكي من أصل ياباني.[68]

كانت إحدى الدراسات الأولى التي أجرتها لجنة الABCC عن نتائج حالات الحمل التي حدثت في هيروشيما وناغازاكي وفي مدينة كورى، التي تقع على بعد 18 ميل (29 كيلومتر) جنوب هيروشيما، وذلك لتحديد الظروف والنتائج ذات الصلة بالتعرض للإشعاعات. وزعم البعض بأن لجنة الABCC لا يمكنها تقديم العلاج الطبي للناجين إلا في القدرات البحثية فقط. [من؟] كما زعم أحد الكتاب بأن لجنة الABCC r] رفضj تقديم العلاج الطبي للناجين من أجل تحسين نتائج البحث.[69][70] وفي عام 1975، تم إنشاء مؤسسة بحوث الآثار الإشعاعية لتحديد مسؤوليات لجنة الABCC.[70]

هيباكوشاعدل

صورة بانورامية للنصب التذكاري لموقع انفجار القنبلة النووية على ناغازاكي.


سمي الضحايا الناجين من التفجيرات هيباكوشا (被爆者)، وهي كلمة يابانية تترجم حرفياً إلى "السكان المتضررين من الانفجار". ونتيجة المعاناة التي سببها القصف، تسعى اليابان للقضاء على استخدام الأسلحة النووية في العالم منذ ذلك الحين، وإصدار واحدة من أقوى السياسات غير النووية. وبحلول اليوم الحادي والثلاثين من شهر مارس لعام 2009، تم اعترفت الحكومة اليابانية بـ235.569 هيباكوشا، ويعيش معظمهم في اليابان.[71] كما اعترفت الحكومة اليابانية بأن حوالي 1 ٪ منهم يعانون من أمراض ناجمة عن الإشعاعات.[72] احتوت النصب التذكارية الموجودة في هيروشيما وناغازاكي على قوائم بأسماء الهيباكوشا الذين لقوا حتفهم منذ وقوع التفجيرات. ويتم تحديثها سنوياً في ذكرى التفجيرات، وسجلت النصب التذكارية في شهر أغسطس عام 2009 أسماء أكثر من 410،000 هيباكوشا - 263،945 في هيروشيما، و149,226 في ناغازاكي.[73]

الناجين الكوريينعدل

وخلال الحرب، جلبت اليابان الكثير من المجندين الكوريين إلى هيروشيما وناغازاكي للعمل هناك. ووفقاً للتقديرات الأخيرة، قُتل حوالي 20،000 من الكوريين في هيروشيما، ومات حوالي 2،000 في ناغازاكي. كما أشارت التقديرات إلى أن واحداً من بين سبعة ضحايا في هيروشيما كانوا من أصل كوري.[9] ولسنوات عديدة، قضى الكوريون وقتاً يقاتلون من أجل الاعتراف بهم كضحايا للقنبلة النووية، وحُرِموا من الفوائد الصحية. ومع ذلك، تم حل النزاع في معظم القضايا من خلال الدعاوى القضائية في السنوات الأخيرة.[74]

الضحية الثنائيةعدل

وفي الرابع والعشرين من شهر مارس لعام 2009، اعترفت الحكومة اليابانية بأن تسوتومو ياماغوتشي يعد هيباكوشا مزدوج. ثيت أن تسوتومو ياماغوتشي كان على بعد 3 كيلومترات من نقطة الانفجار في مدينة هيروشيما أثناء رحلة عمل. وقد أصيب بحروق خطيرة على جانبه الايسر، وأمضى الليل في مدينة هيروشيما. ثم عاد إلى منزله في مدينة ناغازاكي في الثامن من شهر أغسطس، أي قبل انفجار القنبلة في ناغازاكي بيومٍ واحد، وقد تعرض للإشعاعات أثناء بحثه عن بقايا أقاربه. وهو أول ناجي مؤكد من التفجيرين.[75]

الجدل حول التفجيراتعدل

القنبلة الذرية كانت أكثر من سلاح دمار شامل ; فقد كانت سلاح نفسي.

إن دور التفجيرات في استسلام اليابان والتبريرات الأخلاقية الأمريكية لاستخدام هذه الأسلحة كان موضوع المناظرات العلمية والشعبية على مدى عقود عديدة. كتب صموئيل ووكر في شهر إبريل عام 2005 عن التأريخ الأخير بشأن هذه المسألة: "يبدو أن الجدل حول استخدام القنبلة سيستمر". وأضاف والكر قائلاً: "إن المسألة الأساسية تكمن في إذا كان استخدام القنبلة ضرورياً لتحقيق النصر في الحرب في منطقة المحيط الهادئ بشروط مرضية للولايات المتحدة. وقد انقسم العلماء في هذا الصدد على مر أربعة عقود." [77]

أكَّد مؤيدو استخدام تلك القنابل أنها تسببت في استسلام اليابان، ومنعت وقوع خسائر على الجانبين خلال الغزو المخطط لليابان: كان من المقرر غزو كيوشو في شهر أكتوبر عام 1945، وغزو هونشو بعد خمسة أشهر. أشارت بعض التقديرات إلى أن خسائر قوات التحالف قد تصل إلى مليون أثناء هذا السيناريو، في حين قد تبلغ الخسائر اليابانية الملايين.[78] بينما قال العارضون أن ذلك كان ببساطة امتداداً لحملة التفجيرات التقليدية الشرسة، وبالتالي لم يكن هناك سبب عسكري لاستخدام تلك القنابل.[79] وهي تعتبر بطبيعتها جريمة غير أخلاقية، وجريمة حرب، وشكلاً من أشكال الإرهاب الدولي.[80]

أنظر أيضاًعدل

المراجععدل

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  59. ^ [138] ^ أعطته الحياة -- وأخذتها أيضاً United States Merchant Marine.org website
  60. ^ "Radiation Dose Reconstruction; U.S. Occupation Forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, 1945-1946 (DNA 5512F)" (PDF). مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 24 يونيو 2006. اطلع عليه بتاريخ June 9, 2006.  [وصلة مكسورة]
  61. ^ "Nagasaki marks tragic anniversary". People's Daily. 2005-08-10. اطلع عليه بتاريخ April 14, 2007. 
  62. ^ "'I saw both of the bombs and lived'". Observer (reported in The Guardian). 2005-07-24. اطلع عليه بتاريخ April 14, 2007. 
  63. ^ Trumbull، Robert (1957). Nine Who Survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tokyo, Japan: Tuttle Publishing. 
  64. ^ Cook، Haruko & Theadore (1992). Japan at War: An Oral History. New York, New York: The New Press. 
  65. أ ب ت "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, A Collection of Primary Sources," (PDF). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162. George Washington University. 1945-08-13.  النص " coauthors General Hull Colone Seazen " تم تجاهله (مساعدة)
  66. ^ [155] ^ كيدو كويتشي نيكي، طوكيو، Daigaku Shuppankai، 1966، p.1223
  67. ^ [156] ^ Terasaki Hidenari, Shôwa tennô dokuhakuroku، عام 1991، ص. 129.
  68. ^ [158] ^ الحروب المنسية: الحرية والثورة في جنوب شرق آسيا، مقدمة: الحرب التي لا تنتهي، كريستوفر بيلي & تيم هاربر، مطبعة جامعة هارفارد، ص.3، ردمك 0674021533
  69. ^ M. Susan Lindee (1994). Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima. University Of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226482375. 
  70. أ ب "The Radiation Effects Research Foundation Website". Rerf.or.jp. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 25 مارس 2009. 
  71. ^ ""Hiroshima sides with Obama on nukes"". The Japan Times. August 7, 2009. مؤرشف من الأصل في 29 مايو 2012. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 17 أغسطس 2009. 
  72. ^ "Relief for A-bomb victims". The Japan Times. 2007-08-15. مؤرشف من الأصل في 29 مايو 2012. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 02 أكتوبر 2007. 
  73. ^ ""On anniversary of A-bombing, Hiroshima mayor says 'yes we can' to no more nukes"". Mainichi Daily News. August 6, 2009. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 17 أغسطس 2009. 
  74. ^ [180] ^ الهيباكوشا: الكفاح الكوري من أجل وضع حد للتمييز تجاه ألف أجنبي من ضحايا القنبلة الذرية [وصلة مكسورة]، ماينيشي ديلي نيوز. التاسع من شهر مايو عام 2008
  75. ^ [182] ^ أقرت اليابان أول ناجي مزدوج للقنبلة
  76. ^ "LEAST ABHORRENT CHOICE", TIME Magazine, February 3, 1947
  77. ^ Walker، J. Samuel (2005). "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground". Diplomatic History. 29 (2): 334. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00476.x. 
  78. ^ http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html
  79. ^ [190] ^ موسوعة كولينز للتاريخ العسكري، دوبوي ودوبوي، وBCA عام 1994، صفحة 1308
  80. ^ Stohl، Michael (1988). "National Interest and State terrorism". The Politics of terrorism. CRC Press. صفحة 279. ISBN 9780824778149. 

قراءات أخرىعدل

هناك مجموعة كبيرة من الأعمال الأدبية حول التفجيرات، وقرار استخدام هذه القنابل، واستسلام اليابان. تمنح المصادر التالية عَيِّنَات من الأعمال البارزة في هذا الموضوع.

  • The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-02985-X. 
  • Campbell, Richard H. (2005). "Chapter 2: Development and Production". The Silverplate Bombers: A History and Registry of the Enola Gay and Other B-29s Configured to Carry Atomic Bombs. McFarland & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-7864-2139-8. 
  • Goldstein, Donald M; Dillon, Katherine V. & Wenger, J. Michael (1995). Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Brasseys, Washington & London. ISBN 1-57488-033-0. 
  • Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark (Editors) (1997). Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. M. E. Sharpe. ISBN 1-56324-967-9 تأكد من صحة |isbn= القيمة: checksum (مساعدة). 
  • Hogan، Michael J. (1996). Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521562066. 
  • Knebel, Fletcher and Bailey, Charles W. (1960). No High Ground. Harper and Row. ISBN 0313242216.  تاريخ التفجيرات، وإتخاذ القرار لاستخدامهما.
  • Merton، Thomas (1962). Original Child Bomb: Points for meditation to be scratched on the walls of a cave. New Directions. ISBN B0007EVXX2 A look at the universal ramifications of this event. 
  • Murakami، Chikayasu (2007). Hiroshima no shiroi sora ~The white sky in Hiroshima~. Bungeisha. ISBN 4286037088. 
  • Ogura، Toyofumi (1948). Letters from the End of the World: A Firsthand Account of the Bombing of Hiroshima. Kodansha International Ltd. ISBN 4-7700-2776-1. 
  • Rhodes، Richard (1977). Enola Gay: The Bombing of Hiroshima. Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1568525974.  الوسيط |author= و |last= تكرر أكثر من مرة (مساعدة)
  • Sekimori، Gaynor (1986). Hibakusha: Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kosei Publishing Company. ISBN 4-333-01204-X. 
  • Sherwin، Martin J. (2003). A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-3957-9. 
  • Sodei، Rinjiro (1998). Were We the Enemy? American Survivors of Hiroshima. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-3750-X. 
  • Sweeney, Charles؛ وآخرون. (1999). War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission. Quill Publishing. ISBN 0380788748. 

الروابط الخارجيةعدل

 " تم تجاهله (مساعدة)

قالب:حرب عالمية ثانية


تصنيف:أسلحة نووية تصنيف:الحرب العالمية الثانية تصنيف:تاريخ اليابان تصنيف:1945 في اليابان تصنيف:حرب نووية


Ibrahim.ID/ملعب6
Atomic bomb mushroom clouds over Hiroshima (left) and Nagasaki (right)

قالب:Campaignbox Pacific War

In August 1945, during the final stage of the Second World War, the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two bombings, which killed at least 129,000 people, remain the only use of nuclear weapons for warfare in history.

As the Second World War entered its sixth and final year, the Allies had begun to prepare for what was anticipated to be a very costly invasion of the Japanese mainland. This was preceded by an immensely destructive firebombing campaign that obliterated many Japanese cities. The war in Europe had concluded when Nazi Germany signed its instrument of surrender on May 8, 1945, but with the Japanese refusal to accept the Allies' demands for unconditional surrender, the Pacific War dragged on. Together with the United Kingdom and China, the United States called for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces in the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945; this was buttressed with the threat of "prompt and utter destruction".

By August 1945, the Allied Manhattan Project had successfully detonated an atomic device in the New Mexico desert and subsequently produced atomic weapons based on two alternate designs. The 509th Composite Group of the U.S. Army Air Forces was equipped with a Silverplate بوينغ بي-29 سوبر فورترس that could deliver them from Tinian in the Mariana Islands.

General Douglas MacArthur and other top military commanders favored continuing the conventional bombing of Japan already in effect and following up with a massive invasion, codenamed “Operation Downfall.” They advised President Truman that such an invasion would result in U.S. casualties of up to 1 million. In order to avoid such a high casualty rate, Truman decided–over the moral reservations of Secretary of War هنري ستيمسون, General Dwight Eisenhower and a number of the Manhattan Project scientists–to use the atomic bomb in the hopes of bringing the war to a quick end. Proponents of the A-bomb–such as James F. Byrnes, Truman’s secretary of state–believed that its devastating power would not only end the war, but also put the U.S. in a dominant position to determine the course of the postwar world.[1]

A uranium gun-type atomic bomb (Little Boy) was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, followed by a plutonium implosion-type bomb (Fat Man) on the city of Nagasaki on August 9. Little Boy exploded 2,000 feet above Hiroshima in a blast equal to 12-15,000 tons of TNT, destroying five square miles of the city. Within the first two to four months of the bombings, the acute effects of the atomic bombings killed 90,000–166,000 people in Hiroshima and 39,000–80,000 in Nagasaki; roughly half of the deaths in each city occurred on the first day. During the following months, large numbers died from the effect of burns, radiation sickness, and other injuries, compounded by illness and malnutrition. In both cities, most of the dead were civilians, although Hiroshima had a sizable military garrison.

On August 15, just days after the bombing of Nagasaki and the Soviet Union's declaration of war, Japan announced its surrender to the Allies. On September 2, it signed the instrument of surrender, effectively ending World War II. The bombings' role in Japan's surrender and their ethical justification are still debated.

Backgroundعدل

Pacific Warعدل

 
Situation of Pacific War by August 1, 1945. Japan still had control of all of Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan and Indochina, a large part of China, including most of the main Chinese cities, and much of the Dutch East Indies

In 1945, the Pacific War between the Empire of Japan and the Allies entered its fourth year. The Japanese fought fiercely, ensuring that U.S. victory would come at an enormous cost. Of the 1.25 million battle casualties incurred by the United States in World War II, including both military personnel killed in action and wounded in action, nearly one million occurred in the twelve-month period from June 1944 to June 1945. December 1944 saw American battle casualties hit an all-time monthly high of 88,000 as a result of the German Ardennes Offensive.[2] In the Pacific the Allies returned to the Philippines,[3] recaptured Burma,[4] and invaded Borneo.[5] Offensives were undertaken to reduce the Japanese forces remaining in Bougainville, New Guinea and the Philippines.[6] In April 1945, American forces landed on Okinawa, where heavy fighting continued until June. Along the way, the ratio of Japanese to American casualties dropped from 5:1 in the Philippines to 2:1 on Okinawa.[2]

As the Allied advance moved inexorably towards Japan, conditions became steadily worse for the Japanese people. Japan's merchant fleet declined from 5,250,000 gross tons in 1941 to 1,560,000 tons in March 1945, and 557,000 tons in August 1945. Lack of raw materials forced the Japanese war economy into a steep decline after the middle of 1944. The civilian economy, which had slowly deteriorated throughout the war, reached disastrous levels by the middle of 1945. The loss of shipping also affected the fishing fleet, and the 1945 catch was only 22% of that in 1941. The 1945 rice harvest was the worst since 1909, and hunger and malnutrition became widespread. U.S. industrial production was overwhelmingly superior to Japan's. By 1943, the U.S, produced almost 100,000 aircraft a year, compared to Japan's production of 70,000 for the entire war. By the summer of 1944, the U.S. had almost a hundred aircraft carriers in the Pacific, far more than Japan's twenty-five for the entire war. In February 1945, Prince Fumimaro Konoe advised the Emperor هيروهيتو that defeat was inevitable, and urged him to abdicate.[7]

Preparations to invade Japanعدل

Even before the surrender of Nazi Germany on May 8, 1945, plans were underway for the largest operation of the Pacific War, Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan.[8] The operation had two parts: Operations Olympic and Coronet. Set to begin in October 1945, Olympic involved a series of landings by the U.S. Sixth Army intended to capture the southern third of the southernmost main Japanese island, Kyūshū.[9] Operation Olympic was to be followed in March 1946 by Operation Coronet, the capture of the Kantō Plain, near Tokyo on the main Japanese island of Honshū by the U.S. First, Eighth and Tenth Armies. The target date was chosen to allow for Olympic to complete its objectives, for troops to be redeployed from Europe, and the Japanese winter to pass.[10]

 
U.S. Army poster prepares the public for the invasion of Japan after ending war on Germany and Italy

Japan's geography made this invasion plan obvious to the Japanese; they were able to predict the Allied invasion plans accurately and thus adjust their defensive plan, Operation Ketsugō, accordingly. The Japanese planned an all-out defense of Kyūshū, with little left in reserve for any subsequent defense operations.[11] Four veteran divisions were withdrawn from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria in March 1945 to strengthen the forces in Japan,[12] and 45 new divisions were activated between February and May 1945. Most were immobile formations for coastal defense, but 16 were high quality mobile divisions.[13] In all, there were 2.3 million Japanese Army troops prepared to defend the home islands, backed by a civilian militia of 28 million men and women. Casualty predictions varied widely, but were extremely high. The Vice Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, Vice Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi, predicted up to 20 million Japanese deaths.[14]

A study from June 15, 1945, by the Joint War Plans Committee,[15] who provided planning information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated that Olympic would result in between 130,000 and 220,000 U.S. casualties of which U.S. dead would be the range from 25,000 to 46,000. Delivered on June 15, 1945, after insight gained from the Battle of Okinawa, the study noted Japan's inadequate defenses due to the very effective sea blockade and the American firebombing campaign. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General of the Army George Marshall, and the Army Commander in Chief in the Pacific, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, signed documents agreeing with the Joint War Plans Committee estimate.[16]

The Americans were alarmed by the Japanese buildup, which was accurately tracked through Ultra intelligence.[17] Secretary of War هنري ستيمسون was sufficiently concerned about high American estimates of probable casualties to commission his own study by Quincy Wright and William Shockley. Wright and Shockley spoke with Colonels James McCormack and Dean Rusk, and examined casualty forecasts by Michael E. DeBakey and Gilbert Beebe. Wright and Shockley estimated the invading Allies would suffer between 1.7 and 4 million casualties in such a scenario, of whom between 400,000 and 800,000 would be dead, while Japanese casualties would have been around 5 to 10 million.[18][19]

Marshall began contemplating the use of a weapon which was "readily available and which assuredly can decrease the cost in American lives":[20] poison gas. Quantities of phosgene, mustard gas, tear gas and cyanogen chloride were moved to Luzon from stockpiles in Australia and New Guinea in preparation for Operation Olympic, and MacArthur ensured that Chemical Warfare Service units were trained in their use.[20] Consideration was also given to using biological weapons against Japan.[21]

Air raids on Japanعدل

 
A B-29 over Osaka on June 1, 1945

While the United States had developed plans for an air campaign against Japan prior to the Pacific War, the capture of Allied bases in the western Pacific in the first weeks of the conflict meant that this offensive did not begin until mid-1944 when the long-ranged بوينغ بي-29 سوبر فورترس became ready for use in combat.[22] Operation Matterhorn involved India-based B-29s staging through bases around Chengdu in China to make a series of raids on strategic targets in Japan.[23] This effort failed to achieve the strategic objectives that its planners had intended, largely because of logistical problems, the bomber's mechanical difficulties, the vulnerability of Chinese staging bases, and the extreme range required to reach key Japanese cities.[24]

United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell determined that Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Mariana Islands would better serve as B-29 bases, but they were in Japanese hands.[25] Strategies were shifted to accommodate the air war,[26] and the islands were captured between June and August 1944. Air bases were developed,[27] and B-29 operations commenced from the Marianas in October 1944.[28] These bases were easily resupplied by cargo ships.[29] The XXI Bomber Command began missions against Japan on November 18, 1944.[30]

The early attempts to bomb Japan from the Marianas proved just as ineffective as the China-based B-29s had been. Hansell continued the practice of conducting so-called high-altitude precision bombing, aimed at key industries and transportation networks, even after these tactics had not produced acceptable results.[31] These efforts proved unsuccessful due to logistical difficulties with the remote location, technical problems with the new and advanced aircraft, unfavorable weather conditions, and enemy action.[32][33]

 
The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of March 9–10, 1945, was the single deadliest air raid of World War II;[34] with a greater area of fire damage and loss of life than the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima or Nagasaki as single events.[35][36]

Hansell's successor, Major General Curtis LeMay, assumed command in January 1945 and initially continued to use the same precision bombing tactics, with equally unsatisfactory results. The attacks initially targeted key industrial facilities but much of the Japanese manufacturing process was carried out in small workshops and private homes.[37] Under pressure from USAAF headquarters in Washington, LeMay changed tactics and decided that low-level incendiary raids against Japanese cities were the only way to destroy their production capabilities, shifting from precision bombing to area bombardment with incendiaries.[38]

Like most strategic bombing during World War II, the aim of the USAAF offensive against Japan was to destroy the enemy's war industries, kill or disable civilian employees of these industries, and undermine civilian morale. Civilians who took part in the war effort through such activities as building fortifications and manufacturing munitions and other war materials in factories and workshops were considered combatants in a legal sense and therefore liable to be attacked.[39][40]

Over the next six months, the XXI Bomber Command under LeMay firebombed 67 Japanese cities. The firebombing of Tokyo, codenamed Operation Meetinghouse, on March 9–10 killed an estimated 100,000 people and destroyed 16 ميل مربع (41 كـم2) of the city and 267,000 buildings in a single night. It was the deadliest bombing raid of the war, at a cost of 20 B-29s shot down by flak and fighters.[41] By May, 75% of bombs dropped were incendiaries designed to burn down Japan's "paper cities". By mid-June, Japan's six largest cities had been devastated.[42] The end of the fighting on Okinawa that month provided airfields even closer to the Japanese mainland, allowing the bombing campaign to be further escalated. Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and the Ryukyu Islands also regularly struck targets in Japan during 1945 in preparation for Operation Downfall.[43] Firebombing switched to smaller cities, with populations ranging from 60,000 to 350,000. According to Yuki Tanaka, the U.S. fire-bombed over a hundred Japanese towns and cities.[44] These raids were also very devastating.[45]

The Japanese military was unable to stop the Allied attacks and the country's civil defense preparations proved inadequate. Japanese fighters and antiaircraft guns had difficulty engaging bombers flying at high altitude.[46] From April 1945, the Japanese interceptors also had to face American fighter escorts based on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.[47] That month, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service and Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service stopped attempting to intercept the air raids in order to preserve fighter aircraft to counter the expected invasion.[48] By mid-1945 the Japanese only occasionally scrambled aircraft to intercept individual B-29s conducting reconnaissance sorties over the country, in order to conserve supplies of fuel.[49] By July 1945, the Japanese had stockpiled 1,156,000 برميل أمريكي (137,800,000 ل; 36,400,000 غال-أمريكي; 30,300,000 غالون إمب) of avgas for the invasion of Japan.[50] While the Japanese military decided to resume attacks on Allied bombers from late June, by this time there were too few operational fighters available for this change of tactics to hinder the Allied air raids.[51]

Atomic bomb developmentعدل

Working in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada, with their respective projects Tube Alloys and Chalk River Laboratories,[52][53] the Manhattan Project, under the direction of Major General Leslie R. Groves, Jr., of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, designed and built the first atomic bombs.[54]

The uranium atom was first split by German physicists Otto Hahn and his assistant Fritz Strassmann in 1938, making the development of an atomic bomb a theoretical possibility. Fearing that the German atomic bomb project would develop atomic weapons first, preliminary research in the U.S. began in late 1939.[55] Progress was slow until the arrival of the British MAUD Committee report in late 1941 showed that only 5-10 kilograms, and not 500 tons, of pure uranium were needed. Arthur H. Compton set up the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, where, on December 2, 1942 the first sustained nuclear chain reaction was achieved. Groves appointed J. Robert Oppenheimer to organize and head the project's Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico.

Two types of bombs were eventually devised. The Hiroshima bomb, known as a Little Boy, was a gun-type fission weapon that used uranium-235, a rare isotope of uranium extracted in giant factories at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.[56] The other was a more powerful and efficient but more complicated implosion-type nuclear weapon using plutonium-239, a synthetic element created in nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington. A test implosion weapon, the gadget, was detonated at Trinity Site, on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico.[57] The Nagasaki bomb, a Fat Man, was a similar device.[58]

There was a Japanese nuclear weapon program, but it lacked the human, mineral and financial resources of the Manhattan Project, and never made much progress towards developing an atomic bomb.[59]

Preparationsعدل

Organization and trainingعدل

 
Aircraft of the 509th Composite Group that took part in the Hiroshima bombing. Left to right: backup plane, The Great Artiste, Enola Gay

The 509th Composite Group was constituted on December 9, 1944, and activated on December 17, 1944, at Wendover Army Air Field, Utah, commanded by Colonel Paul Tibbets.[60] Tibbets was assigned to organize and command a combat group to develop the means of delivering an atomic weapon against targets in Germany and Japan. Because the flying squadrons of the group consisted of both bomber and transport aircraft, the group was designated as a "composite" rather than a "bombardment" unit.[61]

Working with the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, Tibbets selected Wendover for his training base over Great Bend, Kansas, and Mountain Home, Idaho, because of its remoteness.[62] Each bombardier completed at least 50 practice drops of inert or conventional explosive pumpkin bombs and Tibbets declared his group combat-ready.[63]

 
The "Tinian Joint Chiefs": Captain William S. Parsons (left), Rear Admiral William R. Purnell (center), and Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell (right)

The 509th Composite Group had an authorized strength of 225 officers and 1,542 enlisted men, almost all of whom eventually deployed to Tinian. In addition to its authorized strength, the 509th had attached to it on Tinian 51 civilian and military personnel from Project Alberta,[64] known as the 1st Technical Detachment.[65] The 509th Composite Group's 393d Bombardment Squadron was equipped with 15 Silverplate B-29s. These aircraft were specially adapted to carry nuclear weapons, and were equipped with fuel-injected engines, Curtiss Electric reversible-pitch propellers, pneumatic actuators for rapid opening and closing of bomb bay doors and other improvements.[66]

The ground support echelon of the 509th Composite Group moved by rail on April 26, 1945, to its port of embarkation at Seattle, Washington. On May 6 the support elements sailed on the SS Cape Victory for the Marianas, while group materiel was shipped on the SS Emile Berliner. The Cape Victory made brief port calls at Honolulu and Eniwetok but the passengers were not permitted to leave the dock area. An advance party of the air echelon, consisting of 29 officers and 61 enlisted men flew by C-54 to North Field on Tinian, between May 15 and May 22.[67]

There were also two representatives from Washington, D.C., Brigadier General Thomas Farrell, the deputy commander of the Manhattan Project, and Rear Admiral William R. Purnell of the Military Policy Committee,[68] who were on hand to decide higher policy matters on the spot. Along with Captain William S. Parsons, the commander of Project Alberta, they became known as the "Tinian Joint Chiefs".[69]

Choice of targetsعدل

 
The mission runs of August 6 and 9, with Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Kokura (the original target for August 9) displayed.
 
General Thomas Handy's order to General Carl Spaatz authorizing the dropping of the atomic bombs

In April 1945, Marshall asked Groves to nominate specific targets for bombing for final approval by himself and Stimson. Groves formed a Target Committee chaired by himself, that included Farrell, Major John A. Derry, Colonel William P. Fisher, Joyce C. Stearns and David M. Dennison from the USAAF; and scientists John von Neumann, Robert R. Wilson and William Penney from the Manhattan Project. The Target Committee met in Washington on April 27; at Los Alamos on May 10, where it was able to talk to the scientists and technicians there; and finally in Washington on May 28, where it was briefed by Tibbets and Commander Frederick Ashworth from Project Alberta, and the Manhattan Project's scientific advisor, Richard C. Tolman.[70]

The Target Committee nominated five targets: Kokura, the site of one of Japan's largest munitions plants; Hiroshima, an embarkation port and industrial center that was the site of a major military headquarters; Yokohama, an urban center for aircraft manufacture, machine tools, docks, electrical equipment and oil refineries; Niigata, a port with industrial facilities including steel and aluminum plants and an oil refinery; and Kyoto, a major industrial center. The target selection was subject to the following criteria:

  • The target was larger than 3 ميل (4.8 كـم) in diameter and was an important target in a large urban area.
  • The blast would create effective damage.
  • The target was unlikely to be attacked by August 1945.[71]

These cities were largely untouched during the nightly bombing raids and the Army Air Forces agreed to leave them off the target list so accurate assessment of the weapon could be made. Hiroshima was described as "an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to rivers it is not a good incendiary target."[71]

The Target Committee stated that "It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. Kyoto had the advantage of being an important center for military industry, as well an intellectual center and hence a population better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value."[71]

Edwin O. Reischauer, a Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, was incorrectly said to have prevented the bombing of Kyoto.[71] In his autobiography, Reischauer specifically refuted this claim:

... the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier.[72] [73]

On May 30, Stimson asked Groves to remove Kyoto from the target list, but Groves pointed to its military and industrial significance.[74] Stimson then approached President هاري ترومان about the matter. Truman agreed with Stimson, and Kyoto was temporarily removed from the target list.[75] Groves attempted to restore Kyoto to the target list in July, but Stimson remained adamant.[76][77] On July 25, Nagasaki was put on the target list in place of Kyoto.[77] Orders for the attack were issued to General Carl Spaatz on July 25 under the signature of General Thomas T. Handy, the acting Chief of Staff, since Marshall was at the Potsdam Conference with Truman.[78] That day, Truman noted in his diary that:

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo]. He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one.[79]

Proposed demonstrationعدل

In early May 1945, the Interim Committee was created by Stimson at the urging of leaders of the Manhattan Project and with the approval of Truman to advise on matters pertaining to nuclear energy.[80] During the meetings on May 31 and June 1, scientist Ernest Lawrence had suggested giving the Japanese a non-combat demonstration.[81] Arthur Compton later recalled that:

It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.[82]

The possibility of a demonstration was raised again in the Franck Report issued by physicist James Franck on June 11 and the Scientific Advisory Panel rejected his report on June 16, saying that "we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." Franck then took the report to Washington, D.C., where the Interim Committee met on June 21 to re-examine its earlier conclusions; but it reaffirmed that there was no alternative to the use of the bomb on a military target.[83]

Like Compton, many U.S. officials and scientists argued that a demonstration would sacrifice the shock value of the atomic attack, and the Japanese could deny the atomic bomb was lethal, making the mission less likely to produce surrender. Allied prisoners of war might be moved to the demonstration site and be killed by the bomb. They also worried that the bomb might be a dud since the Trinity test was of a stationary device, not an air-dropped bomb. In addition, only two bombs would be available at the start of August, although more were in production, and they cost billions of dollars, so using one for a demonstration would be expensive.[84][85]

Leafletsعدل

 
This type of leaflet was dropped on Japan, showing the names of 12 Japanese cities targeted for destruction by firebombing. The other side contained text saying "we cannot promise that only these cities will be among those attacked ..."

For several months, the U.S. had dropped more than 63 million leaflets across Japan warning civilians of air raids. Many Japanese cities suffered terrible damage from aerial bombings, some were as much as 97% destroyed. LeMay thought that this would increase the psychological impact of bombing, and reduce the stigma of area bombing cities. Even with the warnings, Japanese opposition to the war remained ineffective. In general, the Japanese regarded the leaflet messages as truthful, but anyone who was caught in possession of one was arrested.[86][87] Leaflet texts were prepared by recent Japanese prisoners of war because they were thought to be the best choice "to appeal to their compatriots".[88]

In preparation for dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, U.S. military leaders decided against a demonstration bomb, and against a special leaflet warning, in both cases because of the uncertainty of a successful detonation, and the wish to maximize psychological shock.[89] No warning was given to Hiroshima that a new and much more destructive bomb was going to be dropped.[90] Various sources give conflicting information about when the last leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima prior to the atomic bomb. Robert Jay Lifton writes that it was July 27,[90] and Theodore H. McNelly that it was July 3.[89] The USAAF history notes eleven cities were targeted with leaflets on July 27, but Hiroshima was not one of them, and there were no leaflet sorties on July 30.[87] Leaflet sorties were undertaken on August 1 and August 4. It is very likely that Hiroshima was leafleted in late July or early August, as survivor accounts talk about a delivery of leaflets a few days before the atomic bomb was dropped.[90] One such leaflet lists twelve cities targeted for firebombing: Otaru, Akita, Hachinohe, Fukushima, Urawa, Takayama, Iwakuni, Tottori, Imabari, Yawata, Miyakonojo, and Saga. Hiroshima was not listed.[91][92][93][94]

Potsdam Declarationعدل

Truman delayed the start of the summit by two weeks in the hope that the bomb could be tested before the start of negotiations with Stalin. The Trinity Test of July 16 exceeded expectations. On July 26, Allied leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. It was presented as an ultimatum and stated that without a surrender, the Allies would attack Japan, resulting in "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland". The atomic bomb was not mentioned in the communiqué. On July 28, Japanese papers reported that the declaration had been rejected by the Japanese government. That afternoon, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō declared at a press conference that the Potsdam Declaration was no more than a rehash (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration and that the government intended to ignore it (mokusatsu, "kill by silence").[95] The statement was taken by both Japanese and foreign papers as a clear rejection of the declaration. Emperor Hirohito, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to non-committal Japanese peace feelers, made no move to change the government position.[96] Japan's willingness to surrender remained conditional on the preservation of the imperial institution; that Japan not be occupied; that the Japanese armed forces be disbanded voluntarily; and that war criminals be prosecuted by Japanese courts.[97]

Under the 1943 Quebec Agreement with the United Kingdom, the United States had agreed that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without mutual consent. In June 1945 the head of the British Joint Staff Mission, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, agreed that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan would be officially recorded as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee.[98] At Potsdam, Truman agreed to a request from Winston Churchill that Britain be represented when the atomic bomb was dropped. William Penney and Group Captain Leonard Cheshire were sent to Tinian, but found that LeMay would not let them accompany the mission. All they could do was send a strongly worded signal back to Wilson.[99]

Bombsعدل

The Little Boy bomb, except for the uranium payload, was ready at the beginning of May 1945.[100] The uranium-235 projectile was completed on June 15, and the target on July 24.[101] The target and bomb pre-assemblies (partly assembled bombs without the fissile components) left Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, California, on July 16 aboard the cruiser USS Indianapolis, arriving July 26.[102] The target inserts followed by air on July 30.[101]

The first plutonium core, along with its polonium-beryllium urchin initiator, was transported in the custody of Project Alberta courier Raemer Schreiber in a magnesium field carrying case designed for the purpose by Philip Morrison. Magnesium was chosen because it does not act as a tamper.[103] The core departed from Kirtland Army Air Field on a C-54 transport aircraft of the 509th Composite Group's 320th Troop Carrier Squadron on July 26, and arrived at North Field July 28. Three Fat Man high-explosive pre-assemblies, designated F31, F32, and F33, were picked up at Kirtland on July 28 by three B-29s, from the 393d Bombardment Squadron, plus one from the 216th Army Air Force Base Unit, and transported to North Field, arriving on August 2.[104]

Hiroshimaعدل

Hiroshima during World War IIعدل

 
The Enola Gay dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on Hiroshima. In this photograph are five of the aircraft's ground crew with mission commander Paul Tibbets in the center.

At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of both industrial and military significance. A number of military units were located nearby, the most important of which was the headquarters of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's Second General Army, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan,[105] and was located in Hiroshima Castle. Hata's command consisted of some 400,000 men, most of whom were on Kyushu where an Allied invasion was correctly anticipated.[106] Also present in Hiroshima were the headquarters of the 59th Army, the 5th Division and the 224th Division, a recently formed mobile unit.[107] The city was defended by five batteries of 7-و-8-سنتيمتر (2.8 و 3.1 in) anti-aircraft guns of the 3rd Anti-Aircraft Division, including units from the 121st and 122nd Anti-Aircraft Regiments and the 22nd and 45th Separate Anti-Aircraft Battalions. In total, over 40,000 military personnel were stationed in the city.[108]

Hiroshima was a minor supply and logistics base for the Japanese military, but it also had large stockpiles of military supplies.[109] The city was a communications center, a key port for shipping and an assembly area for troops.[74] It was also the second largest city in Japan after Kyoto that was still undamaged by air raids,[110] due to the fact that it lacked the aircraft manufacturing industry that was the XXI Bomber Command's priority target. On July 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed it off limits to bombers, along with Kokura, Niigata and Kyoto.[111]

The center of the city contained several reinforced concrete buildings and lighter structures. Outside the center, the area was congested by a dense collection of small wooden workshops set among Japanese houses. A few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the city. The houses were constructed of wood with tile roofs, and many of the industrial buildings were also built around wood frames. The city as a whole was highly susceptible to fire damage.[112]

The population of Hiroshima had reached a peak of over 381,000 earlier in the war but prior to the atomic bombing, the population had steadily decreased because of a systematic evacuation ordered by the Japanese government. At the time of the attack, the population was approximately 340,000–350,000.[113] Residents wondered why Hiroshima had been spared destruction by firebombing.[114] Some speculated that the city was to be saved for U.S. occupation headquarters, others thought perhaps their relatives in Hawaii and California had petitioned the U.S. government to avoid bombing Hiroshima.[115] More realistic city officials had ordered buildings torn down to create long, straight firebreaks, beginning in 1944.[116] Firebreaks continued to be expanded and extended up to the morning of August 6, 1945.[117]

The bombingعدل

Hiroshima was the primary target of the first nuclear bombing mission on August 6, with Kokura and Nagasaki as alternative targets. The 393d Bombardment Squadron B-29 Enola Gay, piloted by Tibbets, took off from North Field, Tinian, about six hours' flight time from Japan. The Enola Gay (named after Tibbets' mother) was accompanied by two other B-29s. The Great Artiste, commanded by Major Charles Sweeney, carried instrumentation, and a then-nameless aircraft later called Necessary Evil, commanded by Captain George Marquardt, served as the photography aircraft.[118]


 
Picture found in Honkawa Elementary School in 2013 of the Hiroshima atom bomb cloud, believed to have been taken about 30 minutes after detonation from about 10 كـم (6.2 ميل) east of the hypocenter
Special Mission 13, Primary target Hiroshima, August 6, 1945[118][119]
Aircraft Pilot Call Sign Mission role
Straight Flush Major Claude R. Eatherly Dimples 85 Weather reconnaissance (Hiroshima)
Jabit III Major John A. Wilson Dimples 71 Weather reconnaissance (Kokura)
Full House Major Ralph R. Taylor Dimples 83 Weather reconnaissance (Nagasaki)
Enola Gay Colonel Paul W. Tibbets Dimples 82 Weapon delivery
The Great Artiste Major Charles W. Sweeney Dimples 89 Blast measurement instrumentation
Necessary Evil Captain. George W. Marquardt Dimples 91 Strike observation and photography
Top Secret Captain Charles F. McKnight Dimples 72 Strike spare—did not complete mission

After leaving Tinian the aircraft made their way separately to Iwo Jima to rendezvous with Sweeney and Marquardt at 05:55 at 9,200 قدم (2,800 m),[120] and set course for Japan. The aircraft arrived over the target in clear visibility at 31,060 قدم (9,470 m).[121] Parsons, who was in command of the mission, armed the bomb during the flight to minimize the risks during takeoff. He had witnessed four B-29s crash and burn at takeoff, and feared that a nuclear explosion would occur if a B-29 crashed with an armed Little Boy on board.[122] His assistant, Second Lieutenant Morris R. Jeppson, removed the safety devices 30 minutes before reaching the target area.[123]

During the night of August 5–6, Japanese early warning radar detected the approach of numerous American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. Radar detected 65 bombers headed for Saga, 102 bound for Maebashi, 261 en route to Nishinomiya, 111 headed for Ube and 66 bound for Imabari. An alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. The all-clear was sounded in Hiroshima at 00:05.[124] About an hour before the bombing, the air raid alert was sounded again, as Straight Flush flew over the city. It broadcast a short message which was picked up by Enola Gay. It read: "Cloud cover less than 3/10th at all altitudes. Advice: bomb primary."[125] The all-clear was sounded over Hiroshima again at 07:09.[126]

At 08:09 Tibbets started his bomb run and handed control over to his bombardier, Major Thomas Ferebee.[127] The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) went as planned, and the Little Boy containing about 64 كـغ (141 رطل) of uranium-235 took 44.4 seconds to fall from the aircraft flying at about 31,000 قدم (9,400 m) to a detonation height of about 1,900 قدم (580 m) above the city.[128][129][130] Enola Gay traveled 11.5 ميل (18.5 كـم) before it felt the shock waves from the blast.[131]

Due to crosswind, the bomb missed the aiming point, the Aioi Bridge, by approximately 800 قدم (240 م) and detonated directly over Shima Surgical Clinic[132] at 34°23′41″N 132°27′17″E / 34.39468°N 132.45462°E / 34.39468; 132.45462. It created a blast equivalent to 16 كيلوطن من تي أن تي (67 تـجول), ± 2 kt.[129] The weapon was considered very inefficient, with only 1.7% of its material fissioning.[133] The radius of total destruction was about 1 ميل (1.6 كـم), with resulting fires across 4.4 ميل مربع (11 كـم2).[134]

People on the ground reported seeing a pika or brilliant flash of light followed by a don, a loud booming sound.[135] Some 70,000–80,000 people, of whom 20,000 were soldiers, or around 30% of the population of Hiroshima, were killed by the blast and resultant firestorm,[136][137] and another 70,000 injured.[138]

Events on the groundعدل

Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima had been very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the blast center. Since the bomb detonated in the air, the blast was directed more downward than sideways, which was largely responsible for the survival of the Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, now commonly known as the Genbaku (A-bomb) dome. This building was designed and built by the Czech architect Jan Letzel, and was only 150 م (490 قدم) from ground zero. The ruin was named Hiroshima Peace Memorial and was made a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996 over the objections of the United States and China, which expressed reservations on the grounds that other Asian nations were the ones who suffered the greatest loss of life and property, and a focus on Japan lacked historical perspective.[139]

The Americans estimated that 4.7 ميل مربع (12 كـم2) of the city were destroyed. Japanese officials determined that 69% of Hiroshima's buildings were destroyed and another 6–7% damaged.[140] The bombing started fires that spread rapidly through wood and paper homes. As in other Japanese cities, the firebreaks proved ineffective.[141]

Hiroshima bombing
Hiroshima aftermath 
Strike order for the Hiroshima bombing as posted on August 5, 1945 
Injured civilian casualties 
The Hiroshima Genbaku Dome after the bombing 
The dark portions of the garments this victim wore during the flash caused burns on the skin 

Eizō Nomura was the closest known survivor, who was in the basement of a reinforced concrete building (it remained as the Rest House after the war) only 170 متر (560 قدم) from ground zero (the hypocenter) at the time of the attack.[142][143] He lived into his 80s.[144][145] Akiko Takakura was among the closest survivors to the hypocenter of the blast. She had been in the solidly built Bank of Hiroshima only 300 متر (980 ft) from ground-zero at the time of the attack.[146]

Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima were killed or injured—most had been in the downtown area which received the greatest damage.[147] The hospitals were destroyed or heavily damaged. Only one doctor, Terufumi Sasaki, remained on duty at the Red Cross Hospital.[141] Nonetheless, by early afternoon, the police and volunteers had established evacuation centres at hospitals, schools and tram stations, and a morgue was established in the Asano library.[148]

Most elements of the Japanese Second General Army headquarters were at physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle, barely 900 يارد (820 م) from the hypocenter. The attack killed 3,243 troops on the parade ground.[149] The communications room of Chugoku Military District Headquarters that was responsible for issuing and lifting air raid warnings was in a semi-basement in the castle. Yoshie Oka, a Hijiyama Girls High School student who had been mobilized to serve as a communications officer had just sent a message that the alarm had been issued for Hiroshima and Yamaguchi when the bomb exploded. She used a special phone to inform Fukuyama Headquarters that "Hiroshima has been attacked by a new type of bomb. The city is in a state of near-total destruction."[150]

Since Mayor Senkichi Awaya had been killed while eating breakfast with his son and granddaughter at the mayoral residence, Field Marshal Hata, who was only slightly wounded, took over the administration of the city, and coordinated relief efforts. Many of his staff had been killed or fatally wounded, including a Korean prince of the Joseon Dynasty, Yi Wu, who was serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Japanese Army.[151][152] Hata's senior surviving staff officer was the wounded Colonel Kumao Imoto, who acted as his chief of staff. Hiroshima Ujina Harbor was undamaged, and soldiers from there used suicide boats intended to repel the American invasion to collect the wounded, and take them down the rivers to the military hospital at Ujina.[151] Trucks and trains brought in relief supplies and evacuated survivors from the city.[153]

Twelve American airmen were imprisoned at the Chugoku Military Police Headquarters located about 1,300 قدم (400 م) from the hypocenter of the blast.[154] Most died instantly, although two were reported to have been executed by their captors, and two prisoners badly injured by the bombing were left next to the Aioi Bridge by the Kempei Tai, where they were stoned to death.[155] Later reports indicated that 8 US prisoners of war held in Hiroshima Castle and executed as part of medical experiments program prior to the bombing were reported by Japanese authorities as having been killed in the atomic blast.[156]

Japanese realization of the bombingعدل

   
Hiroshima before the bombing.
Hiroshima after the bombing.

The Tokyo control operator of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but it too had failed.[157] About 20 minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within 16 كـم (9.9 ميل) of the city came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff.[158]

Military bases repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the General Staff; they knew that no large enemy raid had occurred and that no sizable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time. A young officer was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was felt that nothing serious had taken place and that the explosion was just a rumor.[158]

The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 160 كـم (99 ميل) from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the land still burning and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke was all that was left. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer, after reporting to Tokyo, began to organize relief measures.[158]

Events of August 7–9عدل

 
Leaflet AB11,[159] with information on the Hiroshima bomb and a warning to civilians to petition the Emperor to surrender was dropped over Japan beginning on August 9,[159] by the 509th Composite Group on the bombing mission. Although it is not identified by them, an AB11 is in the possession of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.[160]

After the Hiroshima bombing, Truman issued a statement announcing the use of the new weapon. He stated, "We may be grateful to Providence" that the German atomic bomb project had failed, and that the United States and its allies had "spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history—and won." Truman then warned Japan: "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware."[161]

The Japanese government did not react. Emperor Hirohito, the government, and the war council considered four conditions for surrender: the preservation of the kokutai (Imperial institution and national polity), assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and demobilization, no occupation of the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or Formosa, and delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government.[162]

The Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on August 5. At two minutes past midnight on August 9, Tokyo time, Soviet infantry, armor, and air forces had launched the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation.[163] Four hours later, word reached Tokyo of the Soviet Union's official declaration of war. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army began preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Korechika Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.[164]

On August 7, a day after Hiroshima was destroyed, Dr. Yoshio Nishina and other atomic physicists arrived at the city, and carefully examined the damage. They then went back to Tokyo and told the cabinet that Hiroshima was indeed destroyed by an atomic bomb. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, estimated that no more than one or two additional bombs could be readied, so they decided to endure the remaining attacks, acknowledging "there would be more destruction but the war would go on."[165] American Magic codebreakers intercepted the cabinet's messages.[166]

Purnell, Parsons, Tibbets, Spaatz, and LeMay met on Guam that same day to discuss what should be done next.[167] Since there was no indication of Japan surrendering,[166] they decided to proceed with dropping another bomb. Parsons said that Project Alberta would have it ready by August 11, but Tibbets pointed to weather reports indicating poor flying conditions on that day due to a storm, and asked if the bomb could be readied by August 9. Parsons agreed to try to do so.[168][167]

Nagasakiعدل

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Nagasaki during World War IIعدل

 
The Bockscar and its crew, who dropped the Fat Man atomic bomb on Nagasaki

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest seaports in southern Japan, and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. The four largest companies in the city were Mitsubishi Shipyards, Electrical Shipyards, Arms Plant, and Steel and Arms Works, which employed about 90% of the city's labor force, and accounted for 90% of the city's industry.[169] Although an important industrial city, Nagasaki had been spared from firebombing because its geography made it difficult to locate at night with AN/APQ-13 radar.[111]

Unlike the other target cities, Nagasaki had not been placed off limits to bombers by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's July 3 directive,[111][170] and was bombed on a small scale five times. During one of these raids on August 1, a number of conventional high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few hit the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city, and several hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works.[169] By early August, the city was defended by the IJA 134th Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the 4th Anti-Aircraft Division with four batteries of 7 سـم (2.8 بوصة) anti-aircraft guns and two searchlight batteries.[108]

In contrast to Hiroshima, almost all of the buildings were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame buildings with wood walls (with or without plaster) and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also situated in buildings of wood or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley. On the day of the bombing, an estimated 263,000 people were in Nagasaki, including 240,000 Japanese residents, 10,000 Korean residents, 2,500 conscripted Korean workers, 9,000 Japanese soldiers, 600 conscripted Chinese workers, and 400 Allied prisoners of war in a camp to the north of Nagasaki.[171][172]

The bombingعدل

Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Tibbets. Scheduled for August 11 against Kokura, the raid was moved earlier by two days to avoid a five-day period of bad weather forecast to begin on August 10.[173] Three bomb pre-assemblies had been transported to Tinian, labeled F-31, F-32, and F-33 on their exteriors. On August 8, a dress rehearsal was conducted off Tinian by Sweeney using Bockscar as the drop airplane. Assembly F-33 was expended testing the components and F-31 was designated for the August 9 mission.[174]

Special Mission 16, Secondary target Nagasaki, August 9, 1945[175]
Aircraft Pilot Call Sign Mission role
Enola Gay Captain George W. Marquardt Dimples 82 Weather reconnaissance (Kokura)
Laggin' Dragon Captain Charles F. McKnight Dimples 95 Weather reconnaissance (Nagasaki)
Bockscar Major Charles W. Sweeney Dimples 77 Weapon Delivery
The Great Artiste Captain Frederick C. Bock Dimples 89 Blast measurement instrumentation
Big Stink Major James I. Hopkins, Jr. Dimples 90 Strike observation and photography
Full House Major Ralph R. Taylor Dimples 83 Strike spare—did not complete mission

At 03:49 on the morning of August 9, 1945, Bockscar, flown by Sweeney's crew, carried Fat Man, with Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29s flying an hour ahead as weather scouts and two additional B-29s in Sweeney's flight for instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged.[176]

 
Strike order for the Nagasaki bombing as posted August 8, 1945

During pre-flight inspection of Bockscar, the flight engineer notified Sweeney that an inoperative fuel transfer pump made it impossible to use 640 غالون أمريكي (2,400 ل; 530 غالون إمب) of fuel carried in a reserve tank. This fuel would still have to be carried all the way to Japan and back, consuming still more fuel. Replacing the pump would take hours; moving the Fat Man to another aircraft might take just as long and was dangerous as well, as the bomb was live. Tibbets and Sweeney therefore elected to have Bockscar continue the mission.[177][178]

This time Penney and Cheshire were allowed to accompany the mission, flying as observers on the third plane, Big Stink, flown by the group's operations officer, Major James I. Hopkins, Jr. Observers aboard the weather planes reported both targets clear. When Sweeney's aircraft arrived at the assembly point for his flight off the coast of Japan, Big Stink failed to make the rendezvous.[176] According to Cheshire, Hopkins was at varying heights including 9,000 قدم (2,700 م) higher than he should have been, and was not flying tight circles over Yakushima as previously agreed with Sweeney and Captain Frederick C. Bock, who was piloting the support B-29 The Great Artiste. Instead, Hopkins was flying 40-ميل (64 كـم) dogleg patterns.[179] Though ordered not to circle longer than fifteen minutes, Sweeney continued to wait for Big Stink, at the urging of Ashworth, the plane's weaponeer, who was in command of the mission.[180]

 
Atomic cloud over Nagasaki

After exceeding the original departure time limit by a half hour, Bockscar, accompanied by The Great Artiste, proceeded to Kokura, thirty minutes away. The delay at the rendezvous had resulted in clouds and drifting smoke from fires started by a major firebombing raid by 224 B-29s on nearby Yahata the previous day over Kokura. Additionally, the Yawata Steel Works intentionally burned coal tar, to produce black smoke.[181] The clouds and smoke resulted in 70% of the area over Kokura being covered, obscuring the aiming point. Three bomb runs were made over the next 50 minutes, burning fuel and exposing the aircraft repeatedly to the heavy defenses of Yawata, but the bombardier was unable to drop visually. By the time of the third bomb run, Japanese antiaircraft fire was getting close, and Second Lieutenant Jacob Beser, who was monitoring Japanese communications, reported activity on the Japanese fighter direction radio bands.[182]

After three runs over the city, and with fuel running low because of the failed fuel pump, they headed for their secondary target, Nagasaki.[176] Fuel consumption calculations made en route indicated that Bockscar had insufficient fuel to reach Iwo Jima and would be forced to divert to Okinawa. After initially deciding that if Nagasaki were obscured on their arrival the crew would carry the bomb to Okinawa and dispose of it in the ocean if necessary, Ashworth ruled that a radar approach would be used if the target was obscured.[183]

At about 07:50 Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53, the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given.[184]

 
Nagasaki before and after bombing

A few minutes later at 11:00, The Great Artiste dropped instruments attached to three parachutes. These instruments also contained an unsigned letter to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a physicist at the University of Tokyo who studied with three of the scientists responsible for the atomic bomb at the University of California, Berkeley, urging him to tell the public about the danger involved with these weapons of mass destruction. The messages were found by military authorities but not turned over to Sagane until a month later.[185] In 1949, one of the authors of the letter, Luis Alvarez, met with Sagane and signed the document.[186]

At 11:01, a last-minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed Bockscar's bombardier, Captain Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The Fat Man weapon, containing a core of about 6.4 كـغ (14 رطل) of plutonium, was dropped over the city's industrial valley at 32°46′25″N 129°51′48″E / 32.77372°N 129.86325°E / 32.77372; 129.86325. It exploded 47 seconds later at 1,650 ± 33 قدم (503 ± 10 م), above a tennis court[187] halfway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works) in the north. This was nearly 3 كـم (1.9 ميل) northwest of the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the Urakami Valley and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills.[188] The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 ± 2 ك.طن.تي أن تي (87.9 ± 8.4 تـجول).[129] The explosion generated heat estimated at 3,900 °م (7,050 °ف) and winds that were estimated at 1,005 كم/س (624 ميل/س).[189]

Big Stink spotted the explosion from a hundred miles away, and flew over to observe.[190] Because of the delays in the mission and the inoperative fuel transfer pump, Bockscar did not have sufficient fuel to reach the emergency landing field at Iwo Jima, so Sweeney and Bock flew to Okinawa. Arriving there, Sweeney circled for 20 minutes trying to contact the control tower for landing clearance, finally concluding that his radio was faulty. Critically low on fuel, Bockscar barely made it to the runway on Okinawa's Yontan Airfield. With only enough fuel for one landing attempt, Sweeney and Albury brought Bockscar in at 150 ميل في الساعة (240 كم/س) instead of the normal 120 ميل في الساعة (190 كم/س), firing distress flares to alert the field of the uncleared landing. The number two engine died from fuel starvation as Bockscar began its final approach. Touching the runway hard, the heavy B-29 slewed left and towards a row of parked B-24 bombers before the pilots managed to regain control. The B-29's reversible propellers were insufficient to slow the aircraft adequately, and with both pilots standing on the brakes, Bockscar made a swerving 90-degree turn at the end of the runway to avoid running off the runway. A second engine died from fuel exhaustion by the time the plane came to a stop. The flight engineer later measured fuel in the tanks and concluded that less than five minutes total remained.[191]

Following the mission, there was confusion over the identification of the plane. The first eyewitness account by war correspondent William L. Laurence of the New York Times, who accompanied the mission aboard the aircraft piloted by Bock, reported that Sweeney was leading the mission in The Great Artiste. He also noted its "Victor" number as 77, which was that of Bockscar, writing that several personnel commented that 77 was also the jersey number of the football player Red Grange.[192] Laurence had interviewed Sweeney and his crew, and was aware that they referred to their airplane as The Great Artiste. Except for Enola Gay, none of the 393d's B-29s had yet had names painted on the noses, a fact which Laurence himself noted in his account. Unaware of the switch in aircraft, Laurence assumed Victor 77 was The Great Artiste,[193] which was in fact, Victor 89.[194]

Events on the groundعدل

 
A photograph of Sumiteru Taniguchi's back injuries taken in January 1946 by a U.S. Marine photographer

Although the bomb was more powerful than the one used on Hiroshima, the effect was confined by hillsides to the narrow Urakami Valley.[195] Of 7,500 Japanese employees who worked inside the Mitsubishi Munitions plant, including mobilized students and regular workers, 6,200 were killed. Some 17,000–22,000 others who worked in other war plants and factories in the city died as well.[196] Casualty estimates for immediate deaths vary widely, ranging from 22,000 to 75,000.[197][198][199][200] In the days and months following the explosion, more people died from bomb effects. Because of the presence of undocumented foreign workers, and a number of military personnel in transit, there are great discrepancies in the estimates of total deaths by the end of 1945; a range of 39,000 to 80,000 can be found in various studies.[113][200]

Unlike Hiroshima's military death toll, only 150 soldiers were killed instantly, including thirty-six from the IJA 134th AAA Regiment of the 4th AAA Division.[108][201] At least eight known POWs died from the bombing and as many as 13 may have died, including a British citizen, Royal Air Force Corporal Ronald Shaw,[202] and seven Dutch POWs.[203] One American POW, Joe Kieyoomia, was in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing but survived, reportedly having been shielded from the effects of the bomb by the concrete walls of his cell.[204] There were 24 Australian POWs in Nagasaki, all of whom survived.[205]

The radius of total destruction was about 1 ميل (1.6 كـم), followed by fires across the northern portion of the city to 2 ميل (3.2 كـم) south of the bomb.[134][206] About 58% of the Mitsubishi Arms Plant was damaged, and about 78% of the Mitsubishi Steel Works. The Mitsubishi Electric Works only suffered 10% structural damage as it was on the border of the main destruction zone. The Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works, the factory that manufactured the type 91 torpedoes released in the attack on Pearl Harbor, was destroyed in the blast.[207]

Plans for more atomic attacks on Japanعدل

 
A Japanese report on the bombing characterized Nagasaki as "like a graveyard with not a tombstone standing"

Groves expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use on August 19, with three more in September and a further three in October.[85] On August 10, he sent a memorandum to Marshall in which he wrote that "the next bomb ... should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August." On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President."[85] Truman had secretly requested this on August 10. This modified the previous order that the target cities were to be attacked with atomic bombs "as made ready".[208]

There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs then in production for Operation Downfall. "The problem now [August 13] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them ... and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use."[85]

Two more Fat Man assemblies were readied, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on August 11 and August 14,[209] and Tibbets was ordered by LeMay to return to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to collect them.[210] At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core.[211] Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until August 16.[212] It could therefore have been ready for use on August 19. Unable to reach Marshall, Groves ordered on his own authority on August 13 that the core should not be shipped.[208]

Surrender of Japan and subsequent occupationعدل

Until August 9, Japan's war council still insisted on its four conditions for surrender. On that day Hirohito ordered Kōichi Kido to "quickly control the situation ... because the Soviet Union has declared war against us." He then held an Imperial conference during which he authorized minister Shigenori Tōgō to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one condition, that the declaration "does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler."[213]

On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "Of course."[214] As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of the Throne, Hirohito recorded on August 14 his capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the next day despite a short rebellion by militarists opposed to the surrender.[215]

In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings:

Moreover, the enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the power to destroy many innocent lives and do incalculable damage. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.[216]

In his "Rescript to the Soldiers and Sailors" delivered on August 17, he stressed the impact of the Soviet invasion and his decision to surrender, omitting any mention of the bombs.[217] Hirohito met with General MacArthur on September 27, saying to him that "[t]he peace party did not prevail until the bombing of Hiroshima created a situation which could be dramatized." Furthermore, the "Rescript to the Soldiers and Sailors" speech he told MacArthur about was just personal, not political, and never stated that the Soviet intervention in Manchuria was the main reason for surrender. In fact, a day after the bombing of Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Hirohito ordered his advisers, primarily Chief Cabinet Secretary Hisatsune Sakomizu, Kawada Mizuho, and Masahiro Yasuoka, to write up a surrender speech. In Hirohito's speech, days before announcing it on radio on August 15, he gave three major reasons for surrender: Tokyo's defenses would not be complete before the American invasion of Japan, Ise Shrine would be lost to the Americans, and atomic weapons deployed by the Americans would lead to the death of the entire Japanese race. Despite the Soviet intervention, Hirohito did not mention the Soviets as the main factor for surrender.[218]

Depiction, public response and censorshipعدل

Life among the rubble in Hiroshima in March and April 1946. Film footage taken by Lieutenant Daniel A. McGovern (director) and Harry Mimura (cameraman) for a United States Strategic Bombing Survey project.

During the war "annihilationist and exterminationalist rhetoric" was tolerated at all levels of U.S. society; according to the British embassy in Washington the Americans regarded the Japanese as "a nameless mass of vermin".[219] Caricatures depicting Japanese as less than human, e.g. monkeys, were common.[219] A 1944 opinion poll that asked what should be done with Japan found that 13% of the U.S. public were in favor of "killing off" all Japanese men, women, and children.[220][221]

After the Hiroshima bomb detonated successfully, Robert Oppenheimer addressed an assembly at Los Alamos "clasping his hands together like a prize-winning boxer".[222] The Vatican was less enthusiastic; its newspaper L'Osservatore Romano expressed regret that the bomb's inventors did not destroy the weapon for the benefit of humanity.[223] Nonetheless, news of the atomic bombing was greeted enthusiastically in the U.S.; a poll in Fortune magazine in late 1945 showed a significant minority of Americans (22.7%) wishing that more atomic bombs could have been dropped on Japan.[224][225] The initial positive response was supported by the imagery presented to the public (mainly the powerful images of the mushroom cloud) and the censorship of photographs that showed corpses and maimed survivors.[224]

Wilfred Burchett was the first journalist to visit Hiroshima after the atom bomb was dropped, arriving alone by train from Tokyo on September 2, the day of the formal surrender aboard the USS Missouri. His Morse code dispatch was printed by the Daily Express newspaper in London on September 5, 1945, entitled "The Atomic Plague", the first public report to mention the effects of radiation and nuclear fallout.[226] Burchett's reporting was unpopular with the U.S. military. The U.S. censors suppressed a supporting story submitted by George Weller of the Chicago Daily News, and accused Burchett of being under the sway of Japanese propaganda. Laurence dismissed the reports on radiation sickness as Japanese efforts to undermine American morale, ignoring his own account of Hiroshima's radiation sickness published one week earlier.[227]

The Hiroshima ruins in March and April 1946, by Daniel A. McGovern and Harry Mimura

A member of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Lieutenant Daniel McGovern, used a film crew to document the results in early 1946.[228] The film crew's work resulted in a three-hour documentary entitled The Effects of the Atomic Bombs Against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The documentary included images from hospitals showing the human effects of the bomb; it showed burned out buildings and cars, and rows of skulls and bones on the ground. It was classified "secret" for the next 22 years.[229] During this time in America, it was a common practice for editors to keep graphic images of death out of films, magazines, and newspapers.[230] The total of 90,000 قدم (27,000 م) of film shot by McGovern's cameramen had not been fully aired as of 2009. According to Greg Mitchell, with the 2004 documentary film Original Child Bomb, a small part of that footage managed to reach part of the American public "in the unflinching and powerful form its creators intended".[228]

Motion picture company Nippon Eigasha started sending cameramen to Nagasaki and Hiroshima in September 1945. On October 24, 1945, a U.S. military policeman stopped a Nippon Eigasha cameraman from continuing to film in Nagasaki. All Nippon Eigasha's reels were then confiscated by the American authorities. These reels were in turn requested by the Japanese government, declassified, and saved from oblivion. Some black-and-white motion pictures were released and shown for the first time to Japanese and American audiences in the years from 1968 to 1970.[228] The public release of film footage of the city post attack, and some research about the human effects of the attack, was restricted during the occupation of Japan, and much of this information was censored until the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, restoring control to the Japanese.[231]

Only the most sensitive and detailed weapons effects information was censored during this period. There was no censorship of the factually written accounts. For example, the book Hiroshima written by Pulitzer Prize winner John Hersey, which was originally published in article form in the popular magazine The New Yorker,[232] on August 31, 1946, is reported to have reached Tokyo in English by January 1947, and the translated version was released in Japan in 1949.[233][234][235] The book narrates the stories of the lives of six bomb survivors from immediately prior, to months after, the dropping of the Little Boy bomb.[232]

Post-attack casualtiesعدل

Film footage taken in Hiroshima in March 1946 showing victims with severe burns

In the spring of 1948, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was established in accordance with a presidential directive from Truman to the National Academy of SciencesNational Research Council to conduct investigations of the late effects of radiation among the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[236] One of the early studies conducted by the ABCC was on the outcome of pregnancies occurring in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a control city, Kure, located 18 ميل (29 كـم) south of Hiroshima, in order to discern the conditions and outcomes related to radiation exposure.[237] Dr. James V. Neel led the study which found that the number of birth defects was not significantly higher among the children of survivors who were pregnant at the time of the bombings.[238] The National Academy of Sciences questioned Neel's procedure which did not filter the Kure population for possible radiation exposure.[239] Among the observed birth defects there was a higher incidence of brain malformation in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, including microencephaly and anencephaly, about 2.75 times the rate seen in Kure.[240][241]

In 1985, Johns Hopkins University human geneticist James F. Crow examined Neel's research and confirmed that the number of birth defects was not significantly higher in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[242] Many members of the ABCC and its successor Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) were still looking for possible birth defects or other causes among the survivors decades later, but found no evidence that they were common among the survivors.[243][244] Despite the insignificance of birth defects found in Neel's study, historian Ronald E. Powaski wrote that Hiroshima experienced "an increase in stillbirths, birth defects, and infant mortality" following the atomic bomb.[245] Neel also studied the longevity of the children who survived the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, reporting that between 90 and 95 percent were still living 50 years later.[243]

Around 1,900 cancer deaths can be attributed to the after-effects of the bombs. An epidemiology study by the RERF states that from 1950 to 2000, 46% of leukemia deaths and 11% of solid cancer deaths among the bomb survivors were due to radiation from the bombs, the statistical excess being estimated at 200 leukemia and 1,700 solid cancers.[246]

Hibakushaعدل

Panoramic view of the monument marking the hypocenter, or ground zero, of the atomic bomb explosion over Nagasaki

The survivors of the bombings are called hibakusha (被爆者؟), a Japanese word that literally translates to "explosion-affected people." As of March 31, 2014, 192,719 hibakusha were recognized by the Japanese government, most living in Japan.[247] The government of Japan recognizes about 1% of these as having illnesses caused by radiation.[248] The memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contain lists of the names of the hibakusha who are known to have died since the bombings. Updated annually on the anniversaries of the bombings, as of August 2014 the memorials record the names of more than 450,000 hibakusha; 292,325 in Hiroshima[249] and 165,409 in Nagasaki.[250]

Hibakusha and their children were (and still are) victims of severe discrimination in Japan due to public ignorance about the consequences of radiation sickness, with much of the public believing it to be hereditary or even contagious.[251] This is despite the fact that no statistically demonstrable increase of birth defects or congenital malformations was found among the later conceived children born to survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[252] A study of the long-term psychological effects of the bombings on the survivors found that even 17–20 years after the bombings had occurred survivors showed a higher prevalence of anxiety and somatization symptoms.[253]

Double survivorsعدل

On March 24, 2009, the Japanese government officially recognized Tsutomu Yamaguchi as a double hibakusha. He was confirmed to be 3 كـم (1.9 ميل) from ground zero in Hiroshima on a business trip when Little Boy was detonated. He was seriously burnt on his left side and spent the night in Hiroshima. He arrived at his home city of Nagasaki on August 8, the day before Fat Man was dropped, and he was exposed to residual radiation while searching for his relatives. He was the first officially recognized survivor of both bombings.[254] He died on January 4, 2010, at the age of 93, after a battle with stomach cancer.[255] The 2006 documentary Twice Survived: The Doubly Atomic Bombed of Hiroshima and Nagasaki documented 165 nijū hibakusha (lit. double explosion-affected people), and was screened at the United Nations.[256]

Korean survivorsعدل

During the war, Japan brought as many as 670,000 Korean conscripts to Japan to work as forced labor.[257] About 20,000 Koreans were killed in Hiroshima and another 2,000 died in Nagasaki. Perhaps one in seven of the Hiroshima victims were of Korean ancestry. For many years, Koreans had a difficult time fighting for recognition as atomic bomb victims and were denied health benefits. Most issues have been addressed in recent years through lawsuits.[258]

Debate over bombingsعدل

The atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon.

— Henry L. Stimson, 1947[259]
 
Citizens of Hiroshima walk by the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, the closest building to have survived the city's atomic bombing

The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. J. Samuel Walker wrote in an April 2005 overview of recent historiography on the issue, "the controversy over the use of the bomb seems certain to continue." He wrote that "The fundamental issue that has divided scholars over a period of nearly four decades is whether the use of the bomb was necessary to achieve victory in the war in the Pacific on terms satisfactory to the United States."[260]

Supporters of the bombings generally assert that they caused the Japanese surrender, preventing casualties on both sides during Operation Downfall. One figure of speech, "One hundred million [subjects of the Japanese Empire] will die for the Emperor and Nation,"[261] served as a unifying slogan, although that phrase was intended as a figure of speech along the lines of the "ten thousand years" phrase.[262] In Truman's 1955 Memoirs, "he states that the atomic bomb probably saved half a million U.S. lives— anticipated casualties in an Allied invasion of Japan planned for November. Stimson subsequently talked of saving one million U.S. casualties, and Churchill of saving one million American and half that number of British lives."[263] Scholars have pointed out various alternatives that could have ended the war without an invasion, but these alternatives could have resulted in the deaths of many more Japanese.[264] Supporters also point to an order given by the Japanese War Ministry on August 1, 1944, ordering the execution of Allied prisoners of war when the POW camp was in the combat zone.[265]

Those who oppose the bombings cite a number of reasons for their view, among them: a belief that atomic bombing is fundamentally immoral, that the bombings counted as war crimes, that they were militarily unnecessary, that they constituted state terrorism,[266] and that they involved racism against and the dehumanization of the Japanese people. Another popular view among critics of the bombings, originating with Gar Alperovitz in 1965 and becoming the default position in Japanese school history textbooks, is the idea of atomic diplomacy: that the United States used nuclear weapons in order to intimidate the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War.[267] The bombings were part of an already fierce conventional bombing campaign. This, together with the sea blockade and the collapse of Germany (with its implications regarding redeployment), could also have led to a Japanese surrender. At the time United States dropped its atomic bomb on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union launched a surprise attack with 1.6 million troops against the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. "The Soviet entry into the war", argued Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation".[268]

Notesعدل

  1. ^ http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki
  2. أ ب Giangreco 2009, pp. 2–3, 49–51.
  3. ^ Williams 1960, p. 307.
  4. ^ Williams 1960, p. 532.
  5. ^ Williams 1960, p. 527.
  6. ^ Long 1963, pp. 48–49.
  7. ^ Coox 1969, pp. 2540–2544.
  8. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 32–34.
  9. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 125–130.
  10. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 169–171.
  11. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 45–48.
  12. ^ Giangreco 2009, p. 21.
  13. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 70–72.
  14. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 121–124.
  15. ^ "The Final Months of the War With Japan. Part III (note 24)". Central Intelligence Agency. اطلع عليه بتاريخ December 17, 2013. 
  16. ^ Carroll 2007, p. 48.
  17. ^ Drea 1992, pp. 202–225.
  18. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 98–99.
  19. ^ Frank 1999, p. 340.
  20. أ ب Giangreco 2009, p. 112.
  21. ^ Schaffer 1985, pp. 164–165.
  22. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, p. 4.
  23. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 22–24.
  24. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 169–175.
  25. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 29–31.
  26. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 507–509.
  27. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 514–521.
  28. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 548–551.
  29. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 536–545.
  30. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 558–560.
  31. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, p. 566.
  32. ^ Sandler 2001, pp. 24–26.
  33. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 574–576.
  34. ^ "March 9, 1945: Burning the Heart Out of the Enemy". Condé Nast. March 9, 2011. اطلع عليه بتاريخ August 8, 2011. 
  35. ^ Laurence M. Vance (August 14, 2009). "Bombings Worse than Nagasaki and Hiroshima". The Future of Freedom Foundation. مؤرشف من الأصل في November 13, 2012. اطلع عليه بتاريخ August 8, 2011. 
  36. ^ Joseph Coleman (March 10, 2005). "1945 Tokyo Firebombing Left Legacy of Terror, Pain". CommonDreams.org. Associated Press. اطلع عليه بتاريخ August 8, 2011. 
  37. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 608–610.
  38. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 568–570.
  39. ^ Edwards 1996, p. 83.
  40. ^ Werrell 1996, p. 250.
  41. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 614–617.
  42. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 642–643.
  43. ^ Kerr 1991, p. 207.
  44. ^ Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young, "Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History."(New York: New Press, 2009), 5,84-85, 117.
  45. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 653–658.
  46. ^ Coox 1994, pp. 412–414.
  47. ^ Coox 1994, p. 422.
  48. ^ Zaloga & Noon 2010, p. 54.
  49. ^ Zaloga & Noon 2010, pp. 58–59.
  50. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 79–80.
  51. ^ Coox 1994, p. 429.
  52. ^ Roosevelt، Frankin D؛ Churchill، Winston (August 19, 1943). "Quebec Agreement". atomicarchive.com. 
  53. ^ Edwards، Gordon. "Canada's Role in the Atomic Bomb Programs of the United States, Britain, France and India". Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. مؤرشف من الأصل في December 13, 2007. اطلع عليه بتاريخ December 4, 2007. 
  54. ^ Jones 1985, p. 89.
  55. ^ Jones 1985, p. 12.
  56. ^ Jones 1985, p. 522.
  57. ^ Jones 1985, pp. 511–516.
  58. ^ Jones 1985, pp. 534–536.
  59. ^ Grunden 1998, pp. 50–52.
  60. ^ "Factsheets: 509th Operational Group". Air Force Historical Studies Office. اطلع عليه بتاريخ December 25, 2011. 
  61. ^ "History of 509th Composite Group – 313th Bombardment Wing – Twentieth Air Force – Activation to August 15, 1945" (PDF). Tinian: 509th CG (AFHRA archived). 1945. صفحات 8–9. اطلع عليه بتاريخ February 1, 2012. 
  62. ^ Tibbets 1998, pp. 163, 167–168.
  63. ^ "Minutes of 3rd Target Committee Meeting 28 May 1945" (PDF). National Archives. مؤرشف (PDF) من الأصل في August 9, 2006. اطلع عليه بتاريخ August 9, 2006. 
  64. ^ Campbell 2005, p. 25.
  65. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, p. 706.
  66. ^ Campbell 2005, pp. 14–15.
  67. ^ "History of 509th Composite Group – 313th Bombardment Wing – Twentieth Air Force – Activation to 15 August 1945" (PDF). Tinian: Air Force Historical Research Agency. 1945. صفحات 17–22. اطلع عليه بتاريخ February 1, 2012. 
  68. ^ Campbell 2005, p. 100.
  69. ^ Christman 1998, p. 176.
  70. ^ Jones 1985, pp. 528–529.
  71. أ ب ت ث "Atomic Bomb: Decision—Target Committee, May 10–11, 1945". مؤرشف من الأصل في August 8, 2005. اطلع عليه بتاريخ August 6, 2005. 
  72. ^ Reischauer 1986, p. 101.
  73. ^ Kelly, Jason M. (2012). "Why Did Henry Stimson Spare Kyoto from the Bomb?: Confusion in Postwar Historiography". Journal of American-East Asian Relations. 19: 183–203. 
  74. أ ب Jones 1985, p. 529.
  75. ^ Hasegawa 2006, pp. 67–68.
  76. ^ Hasegawa 2006, pp. 149–150.
  77. أ ب Jones 1985, p. 530.
  78. ^ Craven & Cate 1953, pp. 712–713.
  79. ^ "Pages from President Truman's diary, July 17, 18, and 25, 1945". Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. اطلع عليه بتاريخ December 16, 2013. 
  80. ^ Frank 1999, pp. 255–256.
  81. ^ Compton 1956, p. 240.
  82. ^ Compton 1956, pp. 238–239.
  83. ^ Frank 1999, pp. 255–260.
  84. ^ Newman 1995, p. 86.
  85. أ ب ت ث "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, A Collection of Primary Sources" (PDF). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162. George Washington University. August 13, 1945. 
  86. ^ Williams، Josette H. "The Information War in the Pacific, 1945: Paths to Peace". Central Intelligence Agency. 
  87. أ ب Craven & Cate 1953, p. 656.
  88. ^ Frank 1999, p. 153.
  89. أ ب McNelly 2000, p. 138.
  90. أ ب ت Lifton 1991, p. 17.
  91. ^ 空襲予告ビラ、高山市民が保管 市内で展示 [Air Raid Notice] (باللغة اليابانية). 岐阜新聞社 (Gifu Shinbunsha (Open Library)). مؤرشف من الأصل في 12 أكتوبر 2013. اطلع عليه بتاريخ January 31, 2013. 
  92. ^ Bungei 1981, p. 215.
  93. ^ Bradley 1999, p. 103.
  94. ^ Miller 1986, p. 43.
  95. ^ Frank 1999, pp. 233–234. The meaning of mokusatsu can fall anywhere in the range of "ignore" to "treat with contempt".
  96. ^ Bix 1996, p. 290.
  97. ^ Asada 1996, p. 39.
  98. ^ Gowing 1964, p. 372.
  99. ^ Thomas & Morgan-Witts 1977, pp. 326, 356, 370.
  100. ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 262.
  101. أ ب Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 265.
  102. ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 30.
  103. ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 45.
  104. ^ Campbell 2005, pp. 38–40.
  105. ^ Giangreco 2009, pp. 64–65, 163.
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    Similarly, several values have been reported as the altitude of the Little Boy bomb at the moment of detonation. Published sources vary in the range of 1,800 to 2,000 قدم (550 to 610 م) above the city. The device was set to explode at 1,885 قدم (575 م), but this was approximate. Malik 1985 uses the figure of 1,903 قدم (580 م) plus or minus 50 ft (15 m), determined after data review by Hubbell et al 1969. Radar returns from the tops of multistory buildings near the hypocenter may have triggered the detonation at a somewhat higher altitude than planned. Kerr et al (2005) found that a detonation altitude of 600 م (1,968.5 قدم), plus or minus 20 م (65.6 قدم), gave the best fit for all the measurement discrepancies.
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  • Ham، Paul (2011). Hiroshima Nagasaki. Sydney: HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-7322-8845-7. OCLC 746754306. 
  • Harvey، Robert (2007). American Shogun: General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the Drama of Modern Japan. Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press. ISBN 1-58567-891-0. OCLC 62134797. 
  • Hasegawa، Tsuyoshi (2006). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01693-4. 
  • Hein، Laura؛ Selden، Mark، المحررون (1997). Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. New York: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-1-56324-967-9. 
  • Hixson، Walter L. (2002). The American Experience in World War II: The Atomic Bomb in History and Memory. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-94035-1. OCLC 59464269. 
  • Hoddeson، Lillian؛ Henriksen، Paul W.؛ Meade، Roger A.؛ Westfall، Catherine L. (1993). Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943–1945. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44132-3. OCLC 26764320. 
  • Hoyt، Edwin P. (2001). Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-8154-1118-9. OCLC 12722494. 
  • Hubbell، Harry؛ Cheka، Joseph؛ Jones، Throyce (1969). The Epicenters of the Atomic Bombs. Reevaluation of All Available Physical Data With Recommended Values. Hiroshima: Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. OCLC 404745043. 
  • Ishikawa، Eisei؛ Swain، David L. (1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-02985-3. OCLC 715904227. 
  • Johnston، Barbara Rose (2008). The Consequential Damages of Nuclear War: The Rongelap Report. Walnutt Creek: Left Coast Press. ISBN 978-1-59874-346-3. 
  • Jones، Vincent (1985). Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 10913875. 
  • Jowett، Philip S.؛ Andrew، Stephen (2002). The Japanese Army 1931–45: 2 1942–45. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-354-5. OCLC 59395824. 
  • Kerr، E. Bartlett (1991). Flames Over Tokyo: the US Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign against Japan 1944–1945. New York: Donald I. Fine Inc. ISBN 1-55611-301-3. 
  • Kerr، George D.؛ Young، Robert W.؛ Cullings، Harry M.؛ Christy، Robert F. (2005). "Bomb Parameters". In Young، Robert W.؛ Kerr، George D. Reassessment of the Atomic Bomb Radiation Dosimetry for Hiroshima and Nagasaki – Dosimetry System 2002 (PDF). Hiroshima: The Radiation Effects Research Foundation. OCLC 271477587. 
  • Kido، Kōichi؛ Yoshitake، Oka (1966). 木戶幸一日記 [Kido Kōichi Diary] (باللغة اليابانية). Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. ISBN 4-13-030012-1. 
  • Knebel، Fletcher؛ Bailey، Charles W. (1960). No High Ground. New York: Harper and Row. ISBN 0-313-24221-6. 
  • Krimsky، Sheldon؛ Shorett، Peter (2005). Rights and Liberties in the Biotech Age: Why We Need a Genetic Bill of Rights. Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4341-2. 
  • Lewis، Robert A.؛ Tolzer، Eliot (August 1957). "How We Dropped the A-Bomb". Popular Science: pp. 71–75, 209–210. ISSN 0161-7370. 
  • Lifton، Robert Jay (1991). Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-4344-X. OCLC 490493399. 
  • Long، Gavin (1963). The Final Campaigns (PDF). Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army. Volume 7. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 1297619. اطلع عليه بتاريخ October 31, 2011. 
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  • McNelly، Theodore H. (2000). "The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb". In Jacob Neufeld. Pearl Harbor to V-J Day: World War II in the Pacific. New York: Diane Publishing Co. ISBN 1-4379-1286-9. 
  • Malik، John (September 1985). "The Yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Explosions" (PDF). Los Alamos National Laboratory. اطلع عليه بتاريخ March 9, 2014. 
  • Miller، Richard Lee (1986). Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing. New York: Two-Sixty Press. ISBN 0-02-921620-6. 
  • Monk، Ray (2012). Robert Oppenheimer: A Life Inside the Center. New York; Toronto: Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-50407-2. 
  • Moore، Mike (July–August 1995). "Troublesome Imagery". Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science. 54 (4): 73–74. ISSN 0096-3402. 
  • Newman، Robert P. (1995). Truman and the Hiroshima Cult. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press. ISBN 0-87013-403-5. OCLC 32625518. 
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  • Preston، Diana (2005). Before The Fallout: From Marie Curie to Hiroshima. New York: Walker & Co. ISBN 0-8027-1445-5. 
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  • Rotter، Andrew J. (2008). Hiroshima: The World's Bomb. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-280437-5. 
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  • Wainstock، Dennis D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-95475-7. OCLC 33243854. 
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  • Walker، J. Samuel (April 2005). "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground". Diplomatic History. 29 (2): 311–334. ISSN 1467-7709. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00476.x. اطلع عليه بتاريخ January 30, 2008. 
  • Werrell، Kenneth P. (1996). Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. ISBN 1-56098-665-4. OCLC 32921746. 
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  • Williams، M. H. (1960). Chronology, 1941–1945. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 1358166. 
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Further readingعدل

There is an extensive body of literature concerning the bombings, the decision to use the bombs, and the surrender of Japan. The following sources provide a sampling of prominent works on this subject matter.

  • Allen، Thomas؛ Polmar، Norman (1995). Code-Name Downfall. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-80406-9. 
  • The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-02985-X. 
  • Gosling، Francis George (1994). The Manhattan Project : Making the Atomic Bomb. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Energy, History Division. OCLC 637052193. 
  • Hogan، Michael J. (1996). Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-56206-6. 
  • Kanabun (2012). المحررون: Kyoko؛ Tam، Young. A story of a girl who survived an atomic bomb [原爆に遭った少女の話]. ASIN B00HJ6H2EK. اطلع عليه بتاريخ December 25, 2013. 
  • Krauss، Robert؛ Krauss، Amelia (2005). The 509th Remembered: A History of the 509th Composite Group as Told by the Veterans Themselves. Buchanan, Michigan: 509th Press. ISBN 0-923568-66-2. OCLC 59148135. 
  • Merton، Thomas (1962). Original Child Bomb: Points for Meditation to be Scratched on the Walls of a Cave. New York: New Directions. OCLC 4527778. 
  • Murakami، Chikayasu (2007). Hiroshima no shiroi sora (The White Sky in Hiroshima). Tokyo: Bungeisha. ISBN 4-286-03708-8. 
  • Ogura، Toyofumi (1948). Letters from the End of the World: A Firsthand Account of the Bombing of Hiroshima. Tokyo: Kodansha International. ISBN 4-7700-2776-1. 
  • Sekimori، Gaynor (1986). Hibakusha: Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company. ISBN 4-333-01204-X. 
  • Thomas، Gordon؛ Morgan-Witts، Max (1977). Enola Gay: The Bombing of Hiroshima. New York: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1-56852-597-4. 
  • Ward، Wilson (Spring 2007). "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima". International Security. 31 (4): 162. ISSN 1531-4804. doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.162. 
  • Warren، Stafford L. (1966). "Manhattan Project". In Ahnfeldt، Arnold Lorentz. Radiology in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army. OCLC 630225. 

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